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The Scope of Judicial Review in
French Administrative Law
GEORGE

I.

A.

BERMANN*

INTRODUCTION

The arguments that may be raised in support of a
claim of abuse of discretion must go to the legality, not
just the wisdom or advisability, of administrative action.
Though the judge is responsible for seeing to it that the
government acts in conformity with law, he may not put
himself in its place or interfere in its functioning. His job
is not to determine whether in a given case a certain administrative official ought to have acted and, if so, in one
particular way. He has neither the means nor the materials for judgments of this sort, nor does he have responsibility for administrative action. Should he undertake to control its wisdom or advisability, he would risk impairing the
normal flow of government.'
These are nearly the words an American court might use in
declining to rule on the merits of administrative action. 2 To be more
exact, the language has the ring of a dissenting opinion in which a
judge accuses his brethren of venturing beyond the domain of the
law into that of policy, where they have no business being.' The
* Assistant Professor, Columbia University School of Law. This article is based in large
part on the author's stage, or internship, at the Conseil d'Etat in Paris from February through
July 1975.
1. M. LETOURNEUR, J. BAUCHET, & J. MERic, LE CONSEM D'ETAT Lr LES TRIBUNAUX
ADMIniSTRATwS 137 (1970) [hereinafter cited as M.LETouRNEUR].
2. The American reader should bear in mind that the French terms administrationand
gouvernement do not have exact equivalents in our usage and are, above all, not to be
confused with their English look-and sound-alikes. When a Frenchman refers to
administration,he means government in its broadest sense, excluding however the French
legislature [parlement] and judicial authority generally. On the other hand, the term
gouvernement is reserved for the national executive-the chief of state and his cabinet. Oddly
enough, the French identify as the gouvernement what we might think of upon hearing the
term, administration. See generally A. DE LA uBAnRE, TRArIt D. Dorr ADMINIMTRATIF 217-18
(6th ed. 1973)[hereinafter cited as A. DE LA UBADRE].
3. E.g., Florida Power & Light Co. v. International Bd. Elec. Workers, 417 U.S. 790,
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words actually come from three members of the Conseil d'Etat,
France's closest analogy to a supreme administrative court, attempting to describe one aspect of that institution's important, yet
delicate, role in French public life.4
The apparent similarity in attitude to judicial review of administrative action by American and French courts is not surprising,
considering the common cultural heritage of the two countries. Both
nations ask the government to act within the limits of the law and
give to an independent professional judiciary major responsibility
for ensuring that it does. At the same time, they both rely on the
notion that judicial, like administrative, institutions function best
when they confine themselves to the task given them and decline
to take on those assigned to other branches of government.
Concededly, French law and tradition subject the government
to special administrative courts, generally the tribunaux
administratifs in the first instance and the Conseil d'Etat on appeal, 5 rather than to the tribunaux judiciaires, which resolve dis816 (1974) (White, J., dissenting); Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428, 454 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting); NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322, 327-28 (1951) (Frankfurter & Douglas,
JJ., dissenting).
4. For a discussion of the Conseil d'Etat and tribunauxadministratifs,as well as French
administrative law generally, see L. BROWN & J. GARNER, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2d
ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as L. BROWN & J. GARNER]; C. FREEDEMAN, THE CONSEIL D'ETAT
IN MODERN FRANCE (1961) [hereinafter cited as C. FREEDEMAN]; C. HAMsON, ExEcUTIVE DIsCRETION AND JUDICIAL CONTROL (1954); F. RIDLEY & J. BLONDEL, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN
FRANCE (1964); B. SCHWARTZ, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE COMMON LAW WORLD
(1954) [hereinafter cited as B. SCHWARTZ]. Among the leading articles on aspects of French
administrative law are Alibert, The French Conseil d'Etat,3 MOD. L. Ray. 257 (1940);Berthdlemy, The Conseil d'Etat in France, 12 J. COMP. LEGIS. & INT'L L. 23 (1930); Brewster, The
Tribunaux Administratifs of France:A Venture in Adjudicative Reorganization, 11 J. PUB.
L. 236 (1962); Brown, DeGaulle'sRepublic and the Rule of Law: Judicial Review and the
Conseil d'Etat, 46 B.U.L. REv. 462 (1966); Brown, The Reform of the FrenchAdministrative
Courts, 22 MOD. L. REv. 357 (1959); D6ak & Rheinstein, The Machinery of Law Administration in France and Germany, 84 U. PA. L. REv. 846 (1936); Drago, Some Recent Reforms of
the French Conseil d'Etat, 13 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1282 (1964); Evans, French and German
Administrative Law, 14 INT'L & Comp. L.Q, 1104 (1965); Lagrange, The French Council of
State, 43 TUL. L. REv. 46 (1968); Langrod, The French Council of State: Its Role in the
Formulationand Implementation of Administrative Law, 49 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 673 (1955);
Letourneur, Control of Governmental Action to Prevent the Violation of Individual Rights,
21 Omo ST. L.J. 559 (1960); Letourneur, Reflections on the Role of the FrenchAdministrative
Judge, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 436 (1959); Letourneur & Drago, The Rule of Law as Understood
in France,7 AM. J. COMP. L. 147 (1958); Letourneur & Hamson, The Control of Discretionary
Executive Powers in France, 11 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 258 (1952); Lobingier, Administrative Law
and Droit Administratif, 91 U. PA. L. REV. 36 (1942); Razi, The French Contentieux
Administratif, 13 AM. U.L. REv. 154 (1964); Remington, The Tribunaux Administratifs:
Protectorsof the French Citizen, 51 TL. L. REv. 33 (1976); Riesenfeld, The French System
Administrative Justice: A Model for American Law?, 18 B.U.L. REV. 48 (1938); Weil, The
Strength and Weakness of FrenchAdministrative Law, 1965 CAMBRIDOE L.J. 242.
5. Until 1953, nearly all formal complaints arising out of administrative action in

19771

JUDICIAL REVIEW IN FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

putes between private citizens. What is more, the principle of separation of powers has been interpreted in France to forbid the
tribunaux judiciaires to "interfere in any way whatsoever with the
performance of administrative functions." ' As a technical matter,
the Conseil d'Etat and the tribunaux administratifs are composed
of civil servants rather than magistrates, which means that their
members do not enjoy a formal guarantee of tenure in office. 7 It
may not be surprising that the great majority of French administrative judges are trained at an elite professional school of public
administration, l'Ecole Nationale d'Administration (I'E.N.A.),
designed to train those who will occupy high public office.' More
surprising, however, is the fact that, while most administrative
judges have already studied law before entering 'E.N.A., a legal
education is not a prerequisite for a seat on an administrative court.9
Further blurring the line between civil servant and judge in
France is the practice of reserving a small number of seats on the
administrative courts for persons who have had distinguished careers in active government service and who, for the first time, are
asked to serve as judges and share the practical insights that their
long years of experience have given them."° Even those who become
judges directly upon graduation from I'E.N.A. are permitted, indeed encouraged, to give a small portion of their time to non-judicial
public service and to take occasional leaves of absence throughout
their career in order to serve the government in one high administrative capacity or another." They do so secure in the knowledge that
France were filed directly in the Conseil d'Etat in Paris for decision by its judicial section
[section du contentieux], in contrast to the four sections administrativeswhich serve important advisory functions for the government. Since 1953, the bulk of administrative litigation
in France is brought before the local tribunauxadministratifswhose decisions are appealable
to the Conseil d'Etat. An excellent outline of these institutions may be found in L. BROWN &
J. GARNER, supra note 4, at 18-29.
6. Law of Aug. 16-24, 1790, art. 13. Similar language is also found in CONST. tit. 3, ch.
5, art. 3 (Fr. 1791); Law of Oct. 7-14, 1790, art. 3; Decree of 16 fructidor, an HI (1795).
7. L. BROWN & J. GARNER, supra note 4, at 41. As a practical matter, members of the
administrative courts are virtually irremovable. Id.
8. L'E.N.A. offers a rigorous training in varying aspects of public administration. Administrative court judges, especially those entering the Conseil d'Etat, have excelled in their
studies at that institution. See generally id. at 39.
9. Id.
10. Recruitment of "outsiders" is described as "au tour extrieur"whenit brings members of the administration into the courts permanently, and as "en service extraordinaire"
when they are to serve for only a limited period of time. The pool from which the latter are
drawn is much the larger of the two. Conseillers en service extraordinairemay include such
categories of persons as legal scholars and union leaders, as well as public servants generally.
Id. at 39-40; B. ScHwARTZ, supra note 4, at 30-31.
11. C. FREEDEMAN, supra note 4, at 37-38.
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their seats on the bench are waiting for them when they return, and
that they will suffer no loss of seniority in the judicial hierarchy.
More significant still, most members of the Conseil d'Etat serve
concurrently in its judicial section, which operates as a court, and
in one of its four administrative sections, which furnish legal advice
to the governiment and which in fact must be consulted by the
government before it introduces bills in parliament or issues its
most important administrative rules and regulations. 12 Recent reforms in the structure of the Conseil d'Etat1 3 have strengthened the
requirement that the members of the Conseil serve in this dual
capacity. Underlying all these efforts toward integrating judicial
and administrative acitivities is the belief that judges who possess
a real familiarity with public administration are better able to give
governmental action the intelligent examination that sound judicial
review requires.
Nevertheless, the apparent peculiarities of French administrative law (droit administratif)can easily be overstated, for there are
fundamental similarities between the French and American systems. Judges on the French administrative courts appear to believe,
no less than their American counterparts, that judicial and administrative functions are distinct and should remain so. This belief has
gained even greater support, both in France and the United States,
as administrative action penetrates further into aspects of social
and economic life that defy traditional judicial analysis. And it is
significant that in analyzing review by the courts of administrative
action, both systems distinguish between lgalitk, the conformity
of administrative action to law, and opportunit, the wisdom and
advisability of that action.
Rather than foreclose comparative analysis, this broad agreement on basic principle in French and American administrative law
is the starting point. Comparing the way in which two systems
translate into practice a shared notion of the judge's role in the
administrative process can be at least as rewarding as comparing
systems with widely divergent premises.
12. On the division of the Conseil d'Etat into a single judicial section and four administrative sections, see L. BRowN & J. GARNER, supra note 4, at 32-36; B. SCHWARTZ, supra note
4, at 12-13.
13. Decree of July 30, 1963, [1963] JOURNAL OrsICIEL DE LA R.PUBLIQUE FRANgAISE
[J.O.] 7107, [1963] Dalloz, Legislation [D.L.] 245; Decree of July 30, 1963, [1963] J.O.
7113, [1963] D.L. 250; Decree of Sept. 9, 1968, [1968] J.O. 8691, [1968] Dalloz-Sirey,
Legislation [D.S.L.] 272.
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SCOPE OF

REVIEW

IN AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
OVERVIEW

A

BRIEF

Generalizing about the scope of judicial review in American
administrative law is a hazardous undertaking. Where an adjudicatory proceeding before an administrative agency is concerned, the
substantial evidence rule14 is probably the best guide to judicial
review of findings of fact, despite uncertainty as to how it should
be applied in concrete cases. According to that rule, in the absence
of express statutory authorization to examine agency findings more
critically,1 5 the courts should limit their review to verifying whether
the agency's record, taken as a whole, contains substantial evidence
on the basis of which the facts that have been found may reasonably
be supported.
When a court does not have an adequate evidentiary record
before it-as might be the case when it reviews the legality of certain
administrative rules and regulations," or of decisions reached with14. Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966); United States v.
Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709, 715-17 (1963); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,
319 U.S. 190, 224 (1943); Mississippi Valley Barge Co. v. United States, 292 U.S. 282, 286-87
(1934); Florida East Coast Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 167, 185 (1914); K. DAvis, ADMINisTRATrIE LAW TEXT 525-27 (3d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as K. DAVIs]; W. GELLHORN & C.
BYSE, ADMiNisTRATrV LAW, CASES AND COMMENTS 379 (6th ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as W.
GELLHORN & C. BYsE]; L. JAFFE, JUDICLL CONTROL OF ADMIsTmTATv AcmoN 596 (abr. 1965)
[hereinafter cited as L. JAIm]; B. SCHWARTZ, ADMNISTRATivE LAW 582 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as B. ScHwARTZ]. Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act provides that, unless
a statute precludes judicial review or commits action to administrative discretion, "[tihe
reviewing court shall. . . (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . (E) unsupported by substantial evidence." Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1967). Cf. REVSED MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATiVE PROCEDURE
ACT § 15(f),(g). For tests both broader and narrower than the substantial evidence rule, see
K. DAvis, supra at 535-38. On the somewhat less deferent position of state courts toward
administrative fact finding, see B. SCHWARTZ, supra at 601-03. More state than federal decisions employ a so-called "clearly erroneous" test under which an agency finding may be
overturned when the reviewing court has the definite conviction that a finding, though supported by some evidence, is erroneous. Id. at 599-600. The RvisED MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 15(g) combines the two tests. Under it, a court may set aside
"administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions [that] are . . . (5) clearly
erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record."
On the differences, if any, between the substantial evidence and the "clearly erroneous" tests,
see K. DAvis, supra at 528-30; L. JAFFn, supra at 615-16, 620; B. SCHWARTZ, supra at 599-603,
and cases cited therein.
15. Cf. United States v. First City Nat'l Bank of Houston, 386 U.S. 361 (1967) (action
to review comptroller of currency decision to approve two mergers). For examples of such
authorization, see L. JAFFE, supranote 14, at 619- 21.
16. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 14, at 603. For cases where the Supreme Court refused
to allow judicial interference with the rule-making authority of federal commissions because
it considered the latter to be in a better position than the courts to design those rules, see
Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973); FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S.
279, 292 (1965); American Trucking Ass'n v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 314-15 (1953);
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out a formal hearing"-it must adopt a different approach.'" To
afford effective review of such informal administrative action, the
court may be forced to play a more active role in compiling the
factual record than the substantial evidence rule alone would suggest. 9 For example, in mandamus actions brought to compel the
government to take action it has allegedly wrongfully withheld, the
courts may have to take fresh evidence themselves,"0 unless they
choose, as is often the case, to remand to the relevant agency for
further findings of fact." However, once the courts have before them
what they consider an adequate record, they still seem to favor some
Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Comm'r, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936). Unless a statute otherwise
provides, administrative rule-making may be informal, resembling legislative committee
hearings more than judicial trials. The agency is not confined, in formulating its rules, to
materials produced at such a hearing. Id. 163. See, e.g., Norwegian Nitrogen Prod. Co. v.
United States, 288 U.S. 294, 317-19 (1933); Pacific Coast European Conference v. United
States, 350 F.2d 197, 205 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 958 (1965). Of course, a statute
may require rule-making proceedings to be formal trial-type hearings, and in such cases
reviewing courts will normally apply the substantial evidence rule. Federal Security Adm'r
v. Quaker Oats Co., 318 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1943).
17. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971). See generally
B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 14, at 603.
18. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-16 (1971); National
Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 700 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827
(1975); Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968);
K. DAvIs, supra note 14, at 527; B. SCHWARTZ, supranote 14, at 603. In the Overton Park case,
the Court held that the substantial evidence rule could not apply and that the test of validity
is whether the action challenged was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 401 U. S. at 415-16 (quoting the Administrative Procedure
Act § 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1967)).
19. In Overton Park, the Supreme Court observed:
[Ilt is necessary to remand this case to the District Court for plenary review of
the Secretary's decision. That review is to be based on the full administrative record
that was before the Secretary at the time he made his decision. But since the bare
record may not disclose the factors that were considered or the Secretary's construction of the evidence it may be necessary for the District Court to require some
explanation in order to determine if the Secretary acted within the scope of his
authority and if the Secretary's action was justifiable under the applicable standard.
The court may require the administrative officials who participated in the
decision to give testimony explaining their action. Of course, such inquiry into the
mental processes of administrative decision-makers is usually to be avoided. ...
But here there are no . . . formal findings and it may be that the only way there
can be effective judicial review is by examining the decisionmakers themselves.
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971). See also National
Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 700-01 (2d Cir. 1975).
20. K. DAvIs, supra note 14, at 460; e.g., Ingalls v. Zuckert, 309 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir.
1962); Poirrier v. St. James Parish Police Jury, 372 F. Supp. 1021, 1026 (E.D. La. 1974), aff'd,
531 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1976).
21. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 140-42 (1973); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1099-1100 (D.C. Cir. 1970); L. JAFFE, supra note 14, at 186-92, and
cases cited therein.

19771

JUDICIAL REVIEW IN FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

form of a "reasonableness" standard in reviewing issues of fact;22
whether that standard is significantly different
in basic outline from
23
the substantial evidence rule is not clear.
Even assuming that some variant of the substantial evidence
rule is appropriate, the rigor of judicial review inevitably depends
upon the importance of the facts in dispute and upon the interests
at stake.24 The Supreme Court, which has fashioned the basic guidelines on the appropriate scope of review, has warned that "the precise ways in which courts interfere with agency findings cannot be
imprisoned within any form of words.

' 25

The freedom of the Ameri-

can judge is reinforced by the fact that nothing in the substantial
evidence rule prevents him from attempting to convert what may
appear to be a pure question of fact into one of law over which (and
here there is little theoretical quarrel) his powers of review may be
total.26

The judicial response to so-called mixed questions of fact and
law is more difficult to describe. The question of whether a statutory
22. Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973); FCC v. Schreiber,
381 U.S. 279, 292 (1965); Associated Indus. v. Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 349 (2d Cir. 1973),

cert. denied, 416 U.S. 942 (1974). A reasonableness test also seems prevalent in state courts
for review of administrative action in the absence of an agency record. E.g., Pell v. Board of
Educ., 34 N.Y. 2d 222, 231, 313 N.E. 2d 321, 325, 356 N.Y.S. 2d 833, 839 (1974); N.Y. Cirv.
PRAc. LAw § 7803 (McKinney 1963) ("arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion");
REvisED MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PRocEDuRE ACT

§ 15(g)(6)

("arbitrary or capricious or

characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion").
23. Associated Indus. v. Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 349 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 942 (1974); Wood v. Post Office Dep't, 472 F.2d 96, 99 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 939 (1973); Jordan v. Silverman, 294 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 1961). But see Bowman
Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 284 (1975). In Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), the Supreme Court described the
applicable judicial inquiry as "a thorough, probing, in-depth review." Id. at 416. But it went
on to make clear that "[a]lthough this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful,
the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute
its judgment for that of the agency." Id. In one case, the Supreme Court grouped together
the tests of "arbitrary, capricious [or] abuse of discretion" and "unsupported by substantial
evidence"; it cited its own definition of substantial evidence as "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Consolo v. Federal
Maritime Comm'r., 383 U.S. 607, 619-20 (1966) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Labor
Bd., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). See generally, K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATrvE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES
649-54, 677-83 (1976) [hereinafter cited as K. DAvIs]; L. JAFFR,supra note 14, at 187-92; B.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 14, at 606; Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The
Limits of JudicialReview, 59 CORN. L. REV. 375, 391 (1974).
24. See generally L. JAFFE, supra note 14, at 618. Naturally, too, judges may well
disagree on whether the substantial evidence test is satisfied in a given case. E.g., Richardson
v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
25. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 489 (19§1).
26. K. DAvis, supra note 14, at 533, (discussing Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347
U.S. 17, 46 (1954)); B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 14, at 644, (discussing FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S.
421, 427 (1920)).
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term has been properly applied to the facts of a given case raises
both factual and legal issues, in that the answer tells us more about
both the character of the facts and the meaning of statutory language. The dominant approach, illustrated by a series of leading
Supreme Court decisions,2 would have the courts exercise independent judgment-at least as far as reliable methods of statutory interpretations allow-over issues that significantly implicate the
content of legislative policy. As guarantors of governmental lawfulness, the courts may determine whether administrative action is
consistent not only with the Constitution, but also with the intentions of the legislature that enacted the law on the basis of which
the action has been taken. On the other hand, how statutory language, its meaning once clarified, ought to be applied to the unique
circumstances of a case is a matter on which the courts should have
less to say. Assured that the agency correctly understands the legislative purpose, the courts should defer to the sound discretion of
that body and accept its legal characterization of the facts as long
as it has a rational basis.2 8
Still, what constitutes limited review inevitably varies with the
administrative body in question. For example, the day-to-day decisions of general administrative officials probably do not receive the
same deference that is paid to the conclusions of specialized agencies on matters within the scope of their expertise. A judge is not
only influenced by his notions of limited review, but also by such
considerations as his faith in the administrative body whose decision is before him, the consistency of that body's decisions, the
thoroughness and fairness of its inquiry, the importance of private
and governmental interests at stake, the judge's assessment of the
comparative qualifications of the court and the agency in the matter, and at times even his personal preference on the merits. 2 Recent
27. Atlanta Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965); FCC v. RCA, 346 U.S. 86 (1953);
O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504 (1951); NLRB v. Hearst Publications,
322 U.S. 111 (1944); Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941). For criticism of this approach, see
L. JAFFE, supra note 14, at 560, 575.
28. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 417 U.S. 283, 307 (1974); NLRB v. United Ins. Co.,
390 U.S. 254, 260 (1968); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236-37 (1963); SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943). This approach is not affected by the Administrative
,
Procedure Act. O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc- 340 U.S. 504 (1951). The "rational
the
Supreme Court. See, e.g., NLRB v.
even
by
basis" test has not always been followed,
Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974); Red Ball Motor Freight, ginc. v. United States, 377
U.S. 311 (1964); NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322 (1951); Davies Warehouse
Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144 (1944). A theoretical variant of the dominant approach was
proposed in NLRB v. Marcus Trucking Co., 286 F.2d 583, 590-91 (2d Cir. 1961).
29. Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968); NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg.
Co., 341 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1951); Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275,
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decisions of some courts reflect impatience with limited review altogether."
Thus, one danger in approaching a foreign system of administrative law is the tendency to underestimate the diversity of one's
own practices. Judicial techniques developed for reviewing administrative action taken after quasi-judicial proceedings are sometimes
assumed to be valid for all administrative action, no matter what
kind of body takes it or how that body operates. In reality, the
courts' role in fact-finding can vary widely with the case. Even if a
judge accepts the distinction between clarification of legislative policy and its application to individualized circumstances, his review
of mixed questions of law and fact depends on where he draws the
3
frontier. '
It is hazardous even to attempt to identify the French and
American institutions that are counterparts of each other, largely
because neither system draws a sharp line between administrative
and judicial functions. The hearing examiner within a large federal
agency (or, as he may now be called, the administrative law judge)
may appear to be just another part of agency machinery, but he is
290 (1946); Barrett Line v. United States, 326 U.S. 179, 197 (1945); Dobson v. Comm'r, 320
U.S. 489, 494-98 (1943); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971); K. DAvis, supra note 14, at 530, 551-55; L. JAM,
supra note 14, at 576; B. ScHwAwrz, supranote 14, at 580-81; Kaufman, JudicialReview of
Agency Action: A Judge's Unburdening, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 201 (1970).
30. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia seems particularly influenced by
whether or not the agency took "a hard look" at the issues. E.g., Portland Cement Ass'n v.
Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC,
444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). Many of the opinions
rendered by judges of that court suggest an intensive, as well as a thoughful and reasoned,
look at findings of fact and applications of the law to the facts. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d
1 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); International Harvester Co., v. Ruckelshaus,
478 F.2d 615, 647-48 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d
584, 597-98 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
Judge Leventhal has remarked that "[oin issues of substantive review, on conformance
to statutory standards and requirements of rationality, the judges must act with restraint.
Restraint, yes, abdication, no." Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d at 69 (Leventhal, J., concurring). In Environmental Defense Fund, Chief Judge Bazelon suggested that we may be past
the time when "courts . . . treated administrative policy decisions with great deference,
confining judicial attention primarily to matters of procedures . . . [and] regularly upheld
agency action, with a nod in the direction of the 'substantial evidence' test, and a bow to the
mysteries of administrative expertise." Judge Bazelon hastens to add, however, that courts
should demand procedural safeguards for "enhancing the integrity of the administrative
process." 439 F.2d at 597-98. These would include, for example, requiring an agency to
provide a hearing to interested persons or to furnish a thoughtful opinion, containing findings
of fact and statements of reasons, in support of its decisions.
31. E.g., Comm'r v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322
U.S. 111 (1944); Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941). For a sampling of different views, see
the excerpts of articles and cases cited in W. GELLHORN & C. BYss, supra note 14, at 427-85.
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in fact charged with the quasi-judicial task of impartially evaluating the evidence before him.32 His role has been aptly described as
semi-independent.3 The presence of formal rule-making or
adjudication at the heart of the administrative process may explain why the idea of limited judicial review is so central to American administrative law.
In France, however, administrative decisions are less often preceded by formal proceedings before independent or even semiindependent officers. As a rule, governmental action comes under
full scrutiny only when it is challenged before the administrative
courts, typically the tribunaux administratifs.Thus, most governmental decisions in France resemble the informal varieties of American administrative action for which more active judicial review
may be appropriate. Not surprisingly, the French administrative
courts have developed patterns of review that appear to be quite
searching when compared to the usual practices of American courts
in reviewing agency decisions reached upon a formal record. Normally, the tribunal administratif itself compiles the record upon
which it reviews the relevant findings of fact, and it is only when
its decision is appealed to the Conseil d'Etat that the case is in
roughly the same shape as an agency action before an American
court. Indeed, one important difference between the two legal systems is that the Conseil d'Etat offers a petitioner not so much a
right of appeal with limited review of issues of fact as a second
opportunity to make out his case.3 1 In theory, rightness rather than
reasonableness is demanded of the tribunaux administratifs,but of
course, in practice, some measure of deference to the judgment of
the lower court is inevitable.
Since the French administrative judge is neither simply an
administrator nor simply a judge, comparison based exclusively on
either an American administrative or judicial model cannot help
but lead to the erroneous impression that review of administrative
action in the United States is somehow incomplete. While the difference in the protection provided by the two systems against
32. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 14, at 291-99.
33. Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 132 (1953); Williams, Fifty Years of the Law of the FederalAdministrative Agencies-and Beyond, 29 FED.
B.J., 267, 270-71 (1970).
34. A. DE LAUBADtRE, supra note 2, at 554. The United States Supreme Court has stated
that it normally accepts, unless unreasonable, the conclusions reached by lower federal courts
in their review of administrative findings. Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 417 U.S. 283, 309-10
(1974); NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 409-10 (1952); NLRB v. Pittsburgh
S.S. Co., 340 U.S. 498, 502-03 (1951). But see O'Keefe v. Smith, Hinchman & Grylls
Assocs., 380 U.S. 359 (1965); Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389 (1953).
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wrongful administrative behavior is much less dramatic than a cursory examination of the problem might suggest, droit administratif
still offers an instructive pattern of judicial review. This article
considers closely the ways in which French courts draw upon and
enforce the distinction between the lgalite and the opportunit6 of
administrative action.
HI.

THE SCOPE OF

REVIEW

IN FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW

At one time, French legal thinkers looked upon judicial review
of administrative action as limited to pure questions of law. Proceeding from the assumption that, by definition, an error of fact
could never amount to an error of law, the courts treated the administration as virtually sovereign so far as factual issues were concerned. 5 As long as it did not plainly violate or misconstrue applicable statutes and regulations, its decisions satisfied what the French
call l6galit administrative." Specifically, action that was taken by
the proper official, according to prescribed procedures, and in conformity with binding texts was assured of judicial approval. The
Conseil. d'Etat eventually developed a doctrine known as detournement de potdvoir forbidding the use of administrative authority
for purposes other than those the legislature contemplated.3 ' But
this doctrine had no further role to play once the government was
found to have pursued an authorized purpose. Unreasonable, even
senseless, administrative behavior could escape censure so long as
it was properly motivated.
Ultimately, the Conseil d'Etat acknowledged that drawing a
rigid distinction between questions of law and fact was arbitrary. It
essentially took the position that if action based on a mistake of fact
is as erroneous and prejudicial to the individual as action based on
a mistake of law, then the same relief should be afforded him
against each.3 1 It accomplished this by enlarging the notion of exce's
de pouvoir, or excess of authority, to include not only the disregard
35. M. LETOURNEUR, supra note 1, at 143; G. VEDEL, DRorr ADMNISTRATiF 593-94 (5th
ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as G. VEDEL].
36. A. DE LAUBAD9RE, supra note 2, at 239.
37. According to doctrine, an act taken for unauthorized purposes is illegal even though
proper in every other respect. For discussion of dktournement de pouvoir, see R. ALmBERT, LE
CONTR6LE JURIDICTIONNEL DE L'ADMINISTRATION AU MOYEN DU RECOURS POUR EXCPS DE Pou-

236-37 (1926); Auby, The Abuse of Power in FrenchAdministrativeLaw, 18 AM. J. COMP.
L. 549 (1970); Gazier, Essai de PresentationNouvelle des Ouvertures du Recours pour Excs
de Pouvoir, 5 CONSEIL D'ETAT ETUDES & DocUmENTs [CONS. D'ET. E. & Docs.] 77, 82 (1951);
JPZE, La Jurisprudencedu Conseil d'Etat et le D~tournement de Pouvoir,60 REVUE DU DROrr
PUBLIC [R.D.P.] 58, 59 (1944).
38. G. VEDEL, supra note 35, at 594.
VOIR

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[16:195

of applicable norms, but also their application to incorrect or impro-

perly characterized facts. The Conseil d'Etat offered its familiar
remedy for such errors: independent judicial examination.
This is not to suggest that the French administrative courts are
unmindful of the difference between simple questions of fact and
mixed quesions of fact and law. The term exactitude mat~rielle des
faits refers to the correctness, in the most literal sense of the word,
of the simple facts underlying administrative action. Whether those
facts have been characterized properly in the light of applicable
norms raises considerations of a different order, known as
qualificationjuridique des faits. But, though they recognize that
establishing the actual occurrence of disputed but verifiable events
is not the same thing as assessing their sufficiency in meeting statutory or regulatory conditions, the courts act upon the belief that
administrative error should be remedied wherever it occurs in the
complex process by which legal texts are applied to concrete cases,
and they therefore treat the two operations very similarly for purposes of judicial review. For Raymond Odent, former president of
the judicial section of the Conseil d'Etat, any other response would
be "paradoxical."39 According to another authority, "case law today
is settled and almost banal in this respect: each time the author of
an administrative decision cites in its support a reason which is
factually incorrect.

. .

that alone is enough to invalidate the deci-

sion."4 The following analysis will first touch very briefly on the
Conseil d'Etat's approach to pure questions of fact before turning
to the knottier problems known to us as mixed questions of fact and
law.
A.

Error of Fact

The case in which the Conseil d'Etat first acknowledged giving
full review of the facts underlying administrative action could
hardly have been more picturesque. The mayor of Hendaye was
dismissed for "offending public decency" when he allegedly directed
a funeral procession through a hole in the cemetery wall, rather than
through the main gate, out of animosity toward the deceased. "Even
if the Conseil d'Etat cannot evaluate the opportunitk of measures
39. R. ODENT, CONTENTIEUX ADMINISTRATIF 1538 (1970-71) [hereinafter cited as R.
ODENT]. President Odent has been succeeded only recently by Claude Heumann, formerly
vice-president of the judicial section. As noted previously, the Conseil d'Etat consists of a
judicial section and four administrative sections. Only in the first capacity does it function
as an administrative court; the administrative sections perform strictly advisory functions.
See note 5 supra.
40. A. DE LAUBADkRE, supra note 2, at 543.
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brought before it," the Conseil held, "it can verify the physical
correctness of the facts underlying them."41 Finding that the procession had not in fact passed through the wall, the Conseil d'Etat set
aside the dismissal as in excess of authority. The decision went on
to suggest that "should the facts be established, [the judge must]
examine whether they could legally justify application of the sanctions provided by statute; 42 that question, however, was never
reached.
The relevant statute in the case required the government to
give its reasons for dismissing a mayor;4 3 and that requirement, the
Conseil d'Etat reasoned, implies both an obligation on the part of
the government to rely upon correct facts and an obligation on the
part of the judge to verify their correctness. One might have wondered, in view of this rationale, whether the Conseil d'Etat would
examine the accuracy of factual findings in the absence of an express requirement that the government explain its action. In a decision rendered shortly thereafter,44 the Conseil d'Etat ordered the
reinstatement of a prefect who had been retired, allegedly upon his
request, when it found that he had never offered his resignation.
Neither the fact that under applicable law the prefect could have
been removed without having resigned nor the fact that the government was not expressly required to give its reasons in the first place
deterred the Conseil d'Etat from looking into whether the alleged
request had ever been made.
One can hardly imagine more classic and reasonably uncomplicated issues of fact than whether a mayor led a funeral cortege
through the wall of a cemetery, or through its main gate, and
whether or not a prefect submitted his resignation. In cases such as
these the Conseil d'Etat plainly promised to verify the exactitude
mat~rielle of the facts upon which the government bases its decisions, however simple these facts might be. Countless cases may be
cited to show that the promise has been taken seriously. 5 President
41. Camino, [1916] Recueil Conseil d'Etat [Rec. Cons. d'Et.] 15, [1922] Sirey,
Jurisprudence [S. Jur.] 11 10, [1917] R.D.P. 460.
42. Id.
43. Law of July 8, 1908, [1908] Dalloz P~riodique et Critique [D.P.] IV 64; [1908]
Gazette du Palais [Gax. Pal.] 619.
44. Tr~pont, [1922] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 65, [1922] R.D.P. 81; accord, Terracher, [1946]
Rec. Cons. d'Et. 185.
45. See, e.g., Ministre de l'Int~rieur v. Mony, [1966] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 280 (whether
the victim of internment during the Algerian crisis belonged to a certain clandestine group);
Ministre de l'Int~rieur v. Loeb, [1965] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 575 (whether one whose driver's
license was suspended suffered from a certain physical disability); Zanoni, [1962] Rec. Cons.
d'Et. 334 (whether a civil servant had ever received notice of his appointment to office before
being suspended from it on account of his continuing absence).
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Odent concludes that "every administrative decision based upon
incorrect facts constitutes exc~s de pouvoir, whatever the subject
matter in which it might arise."4 6
Still, the formula of full review over findings of fact should not
be taken literally. First, the petitioner bears the burden of proving
that a finding is incorrect and, if in doubt, the judge normally sustains the finding. Since in France, no less than in America, doubt
rarely consists of a single, precise point of uncertainty, a judge
nearly always has latitude in determining whether the burden has
been discharged. Second, the record the government has compiled
in the case may carry greater weight with the administrative judge
than the petitioner's counter-assertions. No formula, not even one
of unmitigated full review, can erase either the natural presumption
that the government acts fairly and properly or the belief that its
findings should not be set aside lightly. Third, the petitioner simply
may lack the time, money, knowledge, or energy needed to disprove
the government's findings.
These remarks, however, are not meant to suggest that the
judge reviews the basic facts under little more than the substantial evidence rule. In order to prevail, the petitioner does not have
to prove that an administrative finding is without any foundation
in the record. Indeed, burdens of proof begin to lose some of their
significance when judges regard rightness, not reasonableness, as
the standard by which to exercise their reviewing authority.
Moreover, the weight the judge gives to government assertions
naturally varies from one issue to another. It is difficult to ascertain
precisely how the objectivity of the French administrative judge is
affected by the fact that he specializes in litigation with the government, is familiar with the realities of public administration, or belongs formally to the executive rather than the judicial branch of
government. If in some respects he is more sympathetic to the administration than he would otherwise be, in other respects he is
more skeptical. Those who have examined the question conclude
unanimously that, on balance, French administrative law judges are
more demanding of the government than their counterparts in the
judicial courts on the occasions in which administrative law dis47
putes come before them.
46. R. ODENT, supra note 39, at 1538.
47. See Borchard, FrenchAdministrative Law, 18 IOWA L. REv. 133, 135 (1932); Duguit,
The French Administrative Courts, 29 POL. SCI. Q. 385, 392-93 (1914); Letourneur, Le Contri3le de l'Administration par le Juge Administratif, 1964 PuB. LAW 9, 18 (1964); Weil, The
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Most important of all, the inequality of the parties, so common
in suits against the government, is offset considerably by the investigative procedures of the French administrative judge." From the
moment suit is brought, one member of the court is appointed reporter (rapporteur)and charged with the process of assembling information relevant to the action from all possible sources
(instruction). By tradition, the rapporteurcollects evidence such as
personal testimony or expert opinion in written form, giving each
party the opportunity to comment on and to contradict what has
been submitted. In addition, it is the rapporteurwho gives structure
to the inquiry: he poses questions of his own, orders the production
of documents, and calls for such details or elaboration as he deems
useful. He may use his discretion-though probably only after consulting with the president or vice-president of the panel of the Conseil d'Etat to which he belongs-to institute certain more formal
measures. These measures include taking oral testimony during special hearings (enquotes), securing independent expert opinion
(expertises), personally inspecting the premises that may be at issue
(visites des lieux), or verifying the authenticity of documents
(certification). Resort to these techniques is not routine, especially
in the Conseil d'Etat.4 9 On the other hand, should new issues arise
in the course of the panel's deliberations, it may ask the rapporteur
to conduct further inquiries (supplements d'instruction). Thus,
though the record (dossier) upon which decision is rendered consists
chiefly of materials produced by the parties, it reflects above all the
rapporteur'sown organization, line of inquiry, and choice of techniques. Except in the case of certain quasi-judicial administrative
organs,50 the rapporteur does not consider himself confined to the
administrative record, even on pure questions of fact.
The fact that the investigation is managed by the judge rather
than by the parties themselves reduces the significance of the burden of proof. The government cannot merely sit back and wait until
the petitioner has met his burden in order to respond, when the
questions come not from the petitioner but from the judge. It has
been said that under these circumstances "[the government's] silence and reticence do not play in its favor."51 In fact, the judge may
Strength and Weakness of French Administrative Law, 1965 CAMB. L.J. 242, 243 (1965).
See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
48. On procedures in the administrative courts, see generally A. DE LAUBADNRE, supra
note 2, at 494; G. VEDEL, supra note 35, at 520-21; Denoix de St. Marc & Labetoulle, Les
Pouvoirs d'Instructiondu Juge Administratif, CONS. D'ET. E. & Docs. 69 (1970).

49. L.
50.
51.

BROWN

& J.

GARNER,

supra note 4, at 47-48.

See note 94 and accompanying text infra.
G. VEDEL, supra note 35, at 521.
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require the administration to account for a decision even though the
petitioner has little or no formal evidence of his own. Especially in
recent years, the administrative courts have taken to shifting the
burden of proof where justified by "serious and grave presumptions," a practice which allows them to rule in favor of the petitioner
when the government's failure to cooperate effectively prevents him
from establishing a case at all.52 For example, in the noted Barel
case,53 the Conseil d'Etat set aside the decision to exclude certain
candidates from a competitive state examination when the Minister
responsible refused to answer the charge that they were excluded
because they were allegedly communists. The case established the
principle that even where vested with discretionary authority, the
government must respond meaningfully to allegations that are serious and supported by some showing; if the government fails to do
so, the allegations will be assumed to be true. In a later case, 4 the
Conseil d'Etat demanded a precise response even where the petitioner made no charge of discrimination. A company had challenged
the government's denial of tax relief for an acquisition on the basis
of a finding that the acquisition would not provide enough benefit
to the community to justify so substantial a loss of tax revenue.
Although applicable law appeared neither to limit the government's
discretion in granting or denying relief, nor to compel it to explain
its decision, the Conseil d'Etat ordered the tribunal administratif
to conduct further inquiries: "The justification (motif) is formulated in terms far too general for the administrative court to exercise
judicial review over the legality of the denial. ... "I'
Still another reflection of the independence of the French administrative judge is the widespread assumption that his decisions
should depend less upon such formalities as presumptions or burdens of proof, as do the decisions of the ordinary courts, than upon
his personal belief (intime conviction) as to the truth. Even
allowing for the fact that "full" review by a judge of the findings of
52. Id. Adjustments in burden of proof serve a similar function in American law. See,
e.g., Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276 (1966); International
Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 643, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See generally Leventhal, EnvironmentalDecisionmakingand the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 509, 53536 (1974).
53. [1954] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 308, [1954] Dalloz, Jurisprudence [D. Jur.] 594, [1954]
S. Jur. III 97, [1954] R.D.P. 509, [1954] Actualite" Juridique Droit Administratif
[A.J.D.A.] 396. See also Vicat-Blanc, [1960] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 877, [1961] D. Jur. 421.
54. Soci~t6 Maison Genestal, (1968] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 62, [1969] D. Jur. 456, [1968]
Jurisclasseur P~riodique [J.C.P.] 1 2203, [1968] J.C.P. II 15581, [1968] A.J.D.A. 102.
55. Id.
56. A. DE LAUBADE
RE, supra note 2, at 495.
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an administrative body generally means something less than full
review, and that some deference to the conclusions of a more or less
expert authority is only natural, review of pure questions of fact by
the French administrative judge appears to be remarkably independent.
B.

Error in the Legal Characterizationof Fact

However it assigns authority over fact-finding in administrative
disputes, each of the two legal systems must also distribute responsibility between the active administration and the administrative
judge for seeing to it that the law is properly applied to the facts.
The French solution to this problem reflects its complexity.
1.

Contr6le normal

All authorities seem to agree that the administrative courts
scrutinize the application of the law to the facts as closely as they
review the findings of fact themselves.5 The case most often cited
for this proposition is the Gomel decision," in which the Conseil
d'Etat set aside a prefect's denial of permission for a construction
project on the ground that the proposed site, the Place Beauvau in
Paris, was a "monumental perspective" within the meaning of a
statute protecting such sites from development deemed harmful. 9
The prefect had not merely made a simple finding of fact, but had
resolved an abstract issue with direct legal consequences. The Conseil d'Etat proposed to exercise full review over such a determination:
It is for the Conseil d'Etat to verify whether the project's
site falls within an existing monumental perspective and,
if so, whether the project would tend to impair it."
The Conseil then substituted its own judgment for that of the administration.'
The kind of decision the court faced in the Gomel case is sometimes described in France in much the same terms as might be
used in the United States:
57. R. ODENT, supra note 39, at 1541.
58. Gomel, [1914] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 487, [1917] S. Jur. 1I 25.
59. Law of July 13, 1911, art. 118, [1911] D.P. IV 166, [1911] Bulletin des Lois 1370.
60. Gomel, [1914] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 487, [1917] S. Jur. HI 25.
61. In other rulings, it agreed with the government that Parc Monceau, Parc de la
Muette, Avenue Gabriel, and the Palais Royal gardens constituted monumental perspectives,
but found that Place Cl6ment in Montmartre did not. See cases cited in M. LairouRNEUR,
supra note 1, at 147.
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Characterizing the facts which are at the basis of a decision is a mixed operation with both factual and legal components, since it means determining whether the facts fall
within a given legal category [emphasis added] .62
Such questions arise frequently in both French and American administrative law, and countless decisions since Gomel find the
courts reviewing the interpretation of undisputed facts in the light
of statutory or regulatory norms." Because this phase of the administrative process is thought to raise issues of law, the French courts
subject it to the full and independent judicial review which they call
contr6le normal.4
On occasion, judicial review in French administrative law is
described in much less familiar terms. For example, three members
of the Conseil d'Etat have suggested that "[t]o accomplish his
task, the judge must purely and simply substitute his personal as' 65
sessment of the facts for that of the official who took the action.
One of these judges has remarked elsewhere that, "since the legality
or illegality of a decision depends on the merits of the judgment on
which it rests . . . the judge cannot uncover the illegality without
examining the merits himself, and this means substituting his judgment for that of the government."" Finally, President Odent states
in his treatise that the judge "undertakes the same evaluations as
the administration, which amounts to replacing its characterization
67
of the facts with his own."
While they may on occasion use language like this to criticize
how some of their colleagues decide cases, American judges rarely
use it to describe their own behavior. The fact is that our judges
sometimes take just as searching a look at administrative action as
their French counterparts profess to take,6 though at other times,
62. G. VEDEL, supra note 35, at 594.
63. See, e.g., Durand, [1968] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 657, [1970] D. Jur. 291 (whether there
exists such dissension within a municipal council as to justify its dissolution); Pr~fet de Police
v. Chambre Syndicale Patronale des Enseignants de la Conduite des V~hicules A Moteur,
[1968] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 14, [1968] R.D.P. 905, [1968] A.J.D.A. 222, [19681 J.C.P. II
15529 (whether a threat to public safety or order justified a mayor's restrictions on civil
liberties); Thibault, [1956] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 463, [1957] D. Jur. 20 (whether a publication
was "licentious" and therefore could be censored).
64. M. LONG, P. WEiL, & G. BRAIANT, LS GRANDS ARAS DE LA JURISPRUDENCE
ADMINISTRATIVE 127 (6th ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as M. LONG].
65.

M. LETOURNEUR, supra note 1, at 146-47.

66. Letourneur, L'Etendue du Contr6le du Juge de l'Exc~s de Pouvoir, 16 CoNs. D'ET.
E. & Docs. 51, 59 (1962).
67. R. ODENT, supra note 39, at 1552.
68. See Comm'r v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
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primarily when the administrative agency is peculiarly qualified to
make the final decision,69 they do not. Other considerations which
might persuade an American judge to defer to the government's
characterization of the facts have already been mentioned. 0
However, the review given by the French administrative courts
to the legal characterization of facts is more complex than the analysis to this point would indicate. Even in theory, the courts review
such characterizations only to the extent that the government's authority to act is made subject by law or regulation to the existence
of certain "legal conditions." 7 ' For these purposes, the French distinguish between the government's obligation to act (comptence
li~e) and its discretionary authority (pouvoir discr~tionnaire).72In
an extreme case of competence li6e, a government official has no
choice in the matter before him, since the applicable law compels
him to draw a specified inference and act in a specified way, once
certain facts are found to exist. Because the law gives such facts
a fixed legal effect, not only is the official's behavior preordained,
but so is the judge's. He need only examine whether the official
has acted and, if so, whether he has acted in the prescribed fashion.
73
Failure in either respect means reversal.
On the other hand, pouvoir discrtionnairerefers to the freedom of an administrative official to draw the inferences he will from
the facts he finds to exist. Since the facts do not dictate his response, he may in effect act as he pleases, or not at all. And the
judge, having no standards by which to test the official's characterization of the facts, is reduced in his scope of review to what French
scholars call contr6le minimum.7 4 Under contr6le minimum, the
judge can still sanction external violations of law, including noncompliance with jurisdictional rules (incompetence) or procedural
rules (vice de forme). Nor is he precluded from inquiring whether
the official based his decision upon inaccurate facts (erreurde fait),
violated substantive rules of law (violation de la loi), or used his
authority for purposes other than those for which it was given to him
(d~tournement de pouvoir).7 The Barel case7 proves that, even in
69. See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
70. See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
71. M. LwroURNEuR, supra note 1, at 161.
72. A. DE LAUBADtRE, supra note 2, at 261.
73. Letourneur, supra note 66, at 56.
74. See subsection III(b)(3) infra.
75. See notes 35-40 and accompanying text supra.
76. [1954] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 308, [1954] D. Jur. 594, [1954] S. Jur.
R.D.P. 509, [1954] A.J.D.A. 396.

m

97, [1954]
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the face of its apparently unfettered discretion, the government may
find its decisions set aside for exc~s de pouvoir on both factual and
legal grounds.
Until certain changes of the past fifteen years, 77 however,
controle minimum was thought to preclude any review at all of the
legal characterization of fact. Judicial activity under this standard
was actually described as "reduced, so far as the facts are concerned, to its minimum, to a review of their sheer physical correctness."' The courts supposed that if a statute or regulation were
meant to limit an official's characterization of the facts, the draftsmen would have included appropriate legal conditions. In their absence, the statute or regulation was presumed to leave officials free
to characterize the facts and draw inferences as they saw fit. Moreover, even if the courts wanted to confine administrative discretion, they simply could not, since they were not given criteria for
doing so. If they were to impose restraints of their own creation,
they would have to abandon l~galit6 for the forbidden reaches of
opportunit6.
Thus, the traditional bench mark of the French administrative
judge was the notion that he should review the legal characterization of fact only to the extent that the law subordinates the government's exercise of authority to the fulfillment of certain legal conditions. Put simply, his scope of review was said to "depend upon the
respective dosages of pouvoir discr~tionnaireand comptence like
which that authority entails."79
The problem of disciplinary action in the civil service illustrates
the logic of contr6le normal. When a civil servant has been disciplined for fault in the performance of his duties and goes to court,
the judge inquires whether the acts alleged actually took place and
whether they amount to punishable fault. The judge may not, however, consider whether it was advisable under the circumstances to
impose a sanction or whether the sanction selected was in proportion to the fault.80 If he were meant to review such questions, the
legal conditions would have been worded accordingly.
The theory of contr6le normal has always been subject to several important qualifications. First, despite appearances, a legal
77. See subsection lI(b)4 infra.
78. R. ODFNT, supra note 39, at 1543.
79. G. VFrEL, supra note 35, at 594.
80. R. ODENT, supra note 39, at 1544. However, the Conseil's recent decision on an
analogous problem, S.A.F.E.R. d'Auvergne et Ministre de I'Agriculture v. Bernette, Cons.
d'Et. [1976] A.J.D.A. 328, suggests that it may be very close to modifying its approach to
disciplinary action against civil servants. See note 86 infra.
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condition may be construed to run in one direction only. The point
may be illustrated by article L 571 of the Public Health Code, which
provides that the maximum number of pharmacies in a given locale
shall be fixed according to population and that excess licenses may
be granted only "if public needs so require.""1 Under the Conseil
d'Etat's original construction of the statute, the administrative
courts examined population needs in a suit challenging the grant of
an exception,8 2 but not in one challenging a refusal.13 Essentially,
the Conseil read the statutory language as implying that excess
licenses would not be issued unless required to satisfy a public need,
but not that they would be issued just because an unsatisfied need
existed. At the same time, the courts examined, in cases of denials
as well as in grants of licenses, whether the government had correctly determined "the territory whose population a proposed pharmacy would most likely be expected to serve." 84 After all, how well
the government drew its map determined how well it set its quotas
in the first place. Only recently, the Conseil d'Etat abandoned its
interpretation of the statute and told the administrative courts to
take a close look at population needs, whether an excess license has
been granted or withheld. 5 In effect, it turned the legal condition
from a protection of existing pharmacies alone into a protection of
applicants as well. Since no statutory reform preceded the change,
this new approach must be read as a case of judicial reinterpretation
of legislative intent.8 8
81. Law of Sept. 11, 1941, art. 37, [1941] J.O. 4018, [1941] D.A.L. 468.
82. Demoiselle Suzanne et Sieur Amic, [1960] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 207; Dame CozicSavoure, [1953] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 86.
83. See Demoiselle Magnin et Ministre des Affaires Sociales v. Lutz, [1969] Rec. Cons.
d'Et. 139; Bergounhoux, [1953] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 263.
84. Rabelle, [1948] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 369.
85. Dame Comiti-Bouillin, [1970] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 720.
86. An even more striking example of the Conseil's creativity with regard to legal
conditions is S.A.F.E.R. d'Auvergne et Ministre de l'Agriculture v. Bernette, Cons. d'Et.
[1976] A.J.D.A. 328, overruling a decision as recent as Ministre du Travail, de l'Emploi et
de la Population v. Soci~t6 des Professionnels du Bitiment et des Travaux Publics, [1975
Rec. Cons. d'Et. 241, which had applied contr6le minimum. In Bernette, the Conseil made
the Labor Inspector's otherwise discretionary authority to grant or deny permission for an
employer to dismiss an employee serving as union representative depend on whether the
latter's faults are "sufficiently serious to warrant his dismissal." Id. The Conseil directed the
Inspector to take such factors into account in reaching his decision as the terms of the labor
contract and the representative's needs in carrying out his duties. But the test is to be slightly
different depending upon whether the Inspector grants or denies authorization. The Inspector
may not grant it unless the employee's fault is "sufficiently serious to warrant his dismissal."
On the other hand, he may deny it, even if dismissal would have been proper, by relying on
"considerations of the general interest," but only so long as a denial would not "excessively
impair" the more specific interests at stake. Id. See generally Nauwelaers & Fabius,
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Second, though petitioners generally bring an action (recours)
for exc~s de pouvoir when they seek to challenge the legality of an
administrative act, they must bring a different kind of suit, a
recours en cassation, if that action happened to be taken by certain
specialized administrative organs operating through quasi-judicial
procedures."7 Putting aside the adage that the recourspour exc~s de
pouvoir is directed against an administrative decision, while the
recours en cassation is directed against an administrative judgment, 8 as well as the fact that the former normally start in the tribunaux administratifs, while the latter are brought directly in the
Conseil d'Etat,'8 the real difference is that in cassationthe scope of
judicial review is somewhat reduced. In narrowing his review of
administrative action of a quasi-judicial character, the French judge
reacts much like the American judge, who likewise tends to show
greater deference to the determinations of specialized quasi-judicial
organs than to other administrative organs. The fact that a narrow
review is more common in American than in French administrative
law may only reflect the relatively greater extent to which the
United States has turned to specialized agencies that operate along
quasi-judicial lines: if cassationremains exceptional in French practice, it is because trial-type administrative procedures are themselves exceptional.
Actually, the difference in scope between the two types of review in French administrative law is much less pronounced today
than it once was. At one time, the Conseil d'Etat declined to review
either the existence or the legal characterization of the facts when
it sat in cassation, in the belief that the findings of a quasi-judicial
body were entitled to special respect and that their review would
constitute an unwarranted duplication of effort. While the Conseil
d'Etat examined the decisions of quasi-judicial bodies for
incompetence, vice de forme, and violation de la loi, much as if they
were lower court rulings,"0 its deference toward their conclusions of
Chronique Gnrale de JurisprudenceAdministrative Frangaise, [1976] A.J.D.A. 304, 306
[hereinafter cited as Nauwelaers & Fabius].
87. Among the administrative bodies subject to review in cassation are the Court of
Accounts, the Court of Budgetary Discipline, the High Council for National Education, the
Central Welfare Commission, the High Commission for Military Grants, the War Pensions
Commission, the High Council for Confiscation of Illegal Profits, as well as a series of professional organizations responsible for the discipline of their members. A. DE LAUBADkRE, supra
note 2, at 400-02; G. VEDEL, supra note 35, at 481-83.
88. G. VEDEL, supra note 35, at 623.
89. A. DE LAUBADtRE, supra note 2, at 394.
90. Interestingly, though, the Conseil d'Etat still refuses to examine the decisions of
specialized administrative bodies from the point of view of d~tournement de pouvoir. Their
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fact was extreme."
As specialized bodies have multiplied in France, chiefly since
the Second World War, the traditional scope of review in cassation
began to strike the Conseil d'Etat as inadequate. Some of the new
and inexperienced bodies wielded considerable power. For example,
the national medical board was given authority to fix professional
standards and to revoke licenses to practice medicine. 2 The Conseil
d'Etat noticeably expanded its control over such specialized administrative bodies. To begin with, the Conseil assumed the right to
verify the correctness of the facts upon which their decisions
rested,93 just as it does under the recourspour exc~s de pouvoir. This
right, however, is subject to an important qualification: while the
rapporteur is free in a recours pour exces de pouvoir to conduct
whatever independent inquiries might strike him as appropriate, he
confines himself to the administrative record established below
94
when he sits in cassation.
More recently, the Conseil d'Etat has strengthened its "rather
relaxed" review over the legal characterization of fact in cassation
cases. 5 In a leading decision, it reversed a ruling of the national
medical board which had suspended an opthalmologist from practice for having entered into a contract which allegedly denied to the
patients of a clinic the right to choose their own doctor, and thus
"affronted the dignity and general interest of the medical profession." 9 After examining the relationship among the doctor, patients, and clinic in question, the Conseil found that the contract
impaired neither the free choice of a doctor nor the interests of the
medical profession; it therefore reversed the suspension order. 7
use of authority for improper purposes is thought to be inconsistent with their "judicial"
character and, in any event, so finding would be viewed as an impermissible affront to their
integrity. Abb6' Giloteaux, [1953] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 117, [1953] S. Jur. In 88, [1954] DallozSirey Jurisprudence [D.S. Jur.] 148. See L. BROWN & J. GARNER, supra, note 4, at 135.
91. A. DE LAUBADPRE, supra note 2, at 557.
92. Id. at 555; M. LONG, supra note 64, at 274-77.
93. One of the earliest of such cases is Farman, [1924] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 829. See
generally, A. DE LAUBADPRE, supra note 2, at 555.
94. Union Commercial de Bordeaux-Bassens, [1951] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 19, [19511 D.
Jur. 335; accord, Bordereau, [1957] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 529.
95. G. VEDEL, supra note 35, at 625.
96. Teyssier, [1947] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 205.
97. To determine whether the board properly characterized the facts in reaching its
decision, the courts need not only a record, but also a statement of the legal and factual bases
for the board's action. The Conseil d'Etat has required bodies whose decisions are subject to
cassation to furnish such information. Dubois, [1948] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 87, [1948] D. Jur.
558.
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Though the distinction between review in proceedings in
cassationand in exc~s de pouvoir is less dramatic today than it once
was, judges are still inclined to give greater weight, both as to the
correctness and the legal characterization of the facts, to the findings of specialized quasi-judicial bodies than to those of individual
administrative agents with general grants of authority. Even among
such quasi-judicial bodies, the courts have drawn distinctions. For
example, it has been suggested that certain professional associations like the national medical board occasionally succumb to bias
or unfairness in their disciplinary functions, resulting in what appears to be a closer examination of their findings than those of the
older and better established agencies."
Ultimately, contr6le normal is only a formula that provides a
notion of the frame of mind, in the loosest sense of the term, with
which the judge approaches his work. Theoretical discussions sometimes leave the impression that the administrative courts exercise
a wholly objective review of the legal characterization of fact, and
one that is identically rigorous in-every case. It is easy to lose sight
of the fact that the government generally benefits from a presumption that its legal characterizations of fact are correct and of the fact
that the strength of that presumption varies from one subject matter to another. Where fundamental liberties are at stake, the administrative courts have shown themselves as exacting as possible;9 "
where difficult and delicate issues are concerned, their contr6le
normal seems to slacken.100 The terse and highly stylized drafting
of administrative court decisions, coupled with the absence of dissenting opinions, can give the false impression that they result from
a vigorous and relentless application of logic, in which policy and
other "subjective" considerations have no place.
The weekly sessions, (s~ances d'instruction), during which the
rapporteurpresents his analysis of the case and a panel, or soussection, of the Conseil d'Etat reaches a preliminary decision, show
that an administrative court opinion in France is something of a
facade, certainly a great deal more of a facade than are either judicial or administrative opinions in the United States. At these
skances, such concerns as the individual or societal interests at
stake, the good faith of the parties, and the judge's own-capacity for
independent judgment play a leading role, though a final opinion
may make no mention of them. The flexibility of the investigative
98. A. DE LAUBADtRE, supra note 2, at 555, 557.
99. See notes 122-25 and accompanying text infra.
100. G. VEDEL, supra note 35, at 319.
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procedures discussed earlier' 0' enables the judge to adapt his review
as these and other considerations may dictate.
Of equal significance is the fact that the courts themselves
ultimately determine the scope and meaning of a legal condition,
subject of course to any legislative redrafting that may follow. On
occasion they go so far as to impute to the draftsmen of legal texts
the intention to impose a condition that is nowhere expressly stated.
For example, though a statute places certain formal, but no substantive conditions upon the government's right to dissolve municipal councils,10 the Conseil d'Etat has made that right equally dependent on whether the council is so paralyzed by internal dissension that it can no longer function properly.' 3 The Conseil's creative
statutory interpretation helps reduce the breadth of the government's discretion by increasing the number of legal conditions that
04
its action must meet.
Inferring legal conditions permits the judge to confine administrative discretion without appeal to so-called "general principles of
law" (principesg~n~raux du droit), i.e., unwritten procedural and
substantive ideals that the Conseil d'Etat over the last thirty years
has recognized as binding legal norms.' 5 Some of these principles
are assumed to have legislative rank and can only be excluded by
express statutory (or of course constitutional) language; others are
deemed constitutional and cannot be avoided by the legislature at
all, though the very limited possibility of constitutional review of
statutes in France often puts a legislative violation of general principles of law beyond judicial reach.0 6 Since inferring legislative or
regulatory intent with respect to a single text is a more modest
101. See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
102. Law of Apr. 5, 1884, art. 43, [1884] D.P. IV 40, [1884] Gaz. Pal. L.4.
103. Thibault, [1952] Rec. Cons. d'Et.394.
104. For a very recent case in which the Conseil went well beyond the applicable statute
and actually made policy by creating and enforcing legal conditions, see S.A.F.E.R.
d'Auvergne et Ministre de l'Agriculture v. Bernette, [1976] A.J.D.A. 328; Nauwelaers &
Fabius, supra note 86.
105. Among these norms are the principles of equality of citizens before the law; les
droits de la defense (akin to procedural due process); freedom of speech, press, assembly, as
well as commerce; non-retroactivity of administrative acts; l'autoritO de la chose jug~e
(akin to notions of res judicata); and prevention of unjust enrichment. For discussions of the
general principles of law, see A. DE LAUBADtRE,supra note 2, at 245-49; M. LzrouRNEuR, supra
note 1, at 149-54; Rivero, Le Juge Administratif Francais: un Juge qui Gouverne?, [1951]
DALLOZ CHRONIQUE 27.
106. Constitutional review of a statute may be had only before the statute has been
promulgated, only in the Conseil Constitutionnel, and only at the request of a limited category of persons: the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the presidents of either
house of the legislature, and sixty members of one house or the other. CONST. art. 61 (Fr.

1958, amended 1974).
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enterprise than establishing a general principle of law, it is the more
common means by which courts confine administrative discretion
when they strongly believe that the draftsmen should have done so.
Finally, the fact that the government relies on incorrect or improperly characterized facts does not necessarily mean that its decisions will be set aside in court. The courts generally sustain a decision when it could not have been any different under law, even if
all factual error had been corrected. If the government's competence
lige would oblige it to reenact precisely the same decision, setting
the decision aside would serve no practical purpose, even though it
might have educational value. Under these circumstances, the
courts tend to overlook the error and, in effect, to substitute the
correct and compelling ground for the incorrect one offered.107
In the more common situation in which administrative action
is based on several grounds, none of which is compelling, but one of
which is incorrect in fact or in law, the judge's task is more delicate.
Traditionally, he sought to identify the ground that was "determinative" and upheld or set aside the action depending upon
whether that ground alone was based on correct and properly characterized facts. 0 8 Where he was unable to ascertain which of several
grounds was determinative, he would normally annul the action if
any one of them was without basis, on the assumption that every
ground mentioned was determinative.' 0 Over time, the Conseil
d'Etat realized how poorly that assumption corresponded to reality
and how many of its annulments served no practical purpose. In a
1968 ruling,110 the Conseil d'Etat directed the administrative courts
to consider whether the government would have taken the same
action if it had relied only upon those grounds that were valid. In
order to avoid annulment of its decision, it is now necessary and
sufficient for the government to persuade a court that, under proper
application of the law to the facts, the outcome would not have been
any different. Of course, the courts may in such a situation refer the
matter back to the government for reconsideration, but in practice
they often decide for themselves, on the existing record, what the
government would do on remand. Actually the practical significance
of the distinction is negligible, largely because the rapporteuris in
107.

A. DE LAUBADtRE, supra note 2, at 547.
108. On this problem of pluralit6 des motifs, see Sauvignon, La Pluralit6des Motifs
dans 1'Exercice d'un Pouvoir Discr~tionnairedevant le Judge de l'Exc~s de Pouvoir, [1971]

A.J.D.A. 200.
109. A. DE

LAUBADtRE,

supra note 2, at 540.

110. Ministre de 1'Economie et des Finances v. Dame Perrot, [1968] Rec. Cons. d'Et.
39, [19681 A.J.D.A. 179.
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regular contact with the parties throughout the instruction, and he
can hardly help but be aware of the government's probable reaction.
Still, the courts do not seem troubled by their opportunity to
second-guess the government. Accustomed as they are to exercising
contr6le normal over the legal characterization of fact, they probably do not find the task too great. For an American judge, however,
the task might well be too great, perhaps even unconstitutional."'
The Conseil d'Etat's recent shift in position demonstrates that
judicial independence is not necessarily measured by the frequency
with which the judge disagrees with the active administration. Although the new approach calls for a more active and penetrating
judicial role than did the previous one, it results in fewer annulments.
Controle minimum aside, the traditional review of administrative action by the French courts seemed bolder than the judicial
review to which we in the United States are accustomed. But while
they appeared unwilling to accept the government's legal characterizations of fact just because they were not arbitrary or unreasonable,
the French administrative courts lacked independence of a very
basic sort. Though they occasionally took liberties in interpreting
the legal conditions imposed by law or in inferring conditions where
none were stated, they did not generally review the characterization
of the facts at all unless statute or regulation had made it a legal
condition for administrative action. For the most part, pouvoir
discr~tionnairemeant no review at all. In this sense, the French
judge was a great deal more deferential to legislative and administrative will than his American counterpart, who would review virtually all government action, if only under a standard of minimal
rationality.12 Whereas arbitrary and unreasonable action by the
111. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) ("a reviewing court, in dealing
with a determination or judgment which an administrative agecny alone is authorized to
make, must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency.
If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the court is powerless to affirm the administrative action by substituting what it considers to be a more adequate or proper basis."); SEC
v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943). See also Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143 (1973).
See generally, Federal Radio Comm'n v. General Elec. Co., 281 U.S. 464 (1930); K. DAvIs,
supra note 14, at 542-43. In the United States, remand to the agency for preparation of a more
adequate record or for further findings or statements of reasons is common in such situations.
E.g., FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 423 U.S. 326 (1976); Natural Resources
Defense Council Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 539 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1976).
112. See Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166 (1970); Lennon v. United States, 387 F.
Supp. 561, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). According to a widely accepted view, both federal and state
standards entitle the courts to intervene, even when discretionary authority is involved, to
prevent abuses, or unreasonable uses, of that authority. One scholar suggests that abuses may
include taking action for improper purposes (e.g., Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C.
1973)), upon erroneous considerations (e.g., NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 292 (1965)), upon
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government in the United States enjoyed precious little legal immunity, however broad the delegation of power under which it was
taken, the Conseil d'Etat's highly literal approach to judicial review
left the French without a remedy in many such situations. The
Conseil d'Etat's recent rethinking of the problem of controlling discretionary authority is discussed below."1
2.

A Review of Opportunit6

When a legal condition is expressed precisely, the courts generally have some idea of the kind of inquiry necessary to ensure that
the condition has been satisfied. On the other hand, imprecision in
statutory or regulatory language gives the courts leeway in deciding
what a stated condition really means and how to determine whether
it has been met. The evolution in recent years of the Conseil d'Etat's
approach to reviewing exercises of eminent domain illustrates the
flexibility that vagueness affords.
When presented with a challenge to the taking of private property for a public purpose, the administrative courts traditionally did
no more than examine whether the taking would serve some purpose
that might be called public.1 14 Since almost any project for which
the government proposes to condemn property can be said to promote some public good, the review afforded in the courts was not
very extensive. Except to discover a possible d~tournement de
extraneous considerations (e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416
(1971)), upon a failure to give considerations their due weight (e.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 612 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966)),
in the absence of any substantial evidence (e.g., First Girl, Inc. v. Regional Manpower
Admin., 499 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1974)), or failing to take action even after an unreasonable
period of time has passed (e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1099
(D.C. Cir. 1970)). B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 14, at 606-07, 610-13. Statutory support for the
proposition that courts may under certain circumstances set aside action committed to administrative discretion has been found in the Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e)(2)(A), 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1967); REVISED MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Aar § 15 (g)(6);
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 7803(3) (McKinney 1963). On the possibility of shielding discretionary
government action from any judicial review whatsoever, see the Berger-Davis debate. Davis,
Scope of Review of FederalAdministrative Action, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 559 (1950); Berger,
Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 55 (1965); Berger,
Administrative Arbitrariness: a Reply to Professor Davis, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 783 (1966);
Davis, Administrative Arbitrariness:a Postscript,114 U. PA. L. REv. 823 (1966); Berger,
Administrative Arbitrariness:a Sequel, 51 MINN. L. REv. 601 (1967); Berger, Administrative
Arbitrariness:aSynthesis, 78 YALE L.J. 965 (1969).
113. See subsection 2, "A Review of Opportunit," and subsection 4, "Erreurmanifeste, " infra.
114. See Groupement de D~fense de l'Il1t Firminy-Centre, [1964] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 299,
[1964] A.J.D.A. 432, [1965] R.D.P. 264; Cambi~ri, [1938] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 962. See generally R. ODENT, supra note 39, at 1558.
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pouvoir, the courts had virtually nothing to say about the merits of
a taking.
In 1971, after trying its hand at more rigorous standards of
review," 5 the Conseil d'Etat rendered its landmark Ville Nouvelle
Est decision,"' which unveiled a new approach. In that case, the
commissaire du gouvernement'l7 suggested that the Conseil "could
no longer limit its inquiry to the question of whether a project in
itself serves a public purpose, but had to weigh its advantages and
disadvantages, cost and benefit or, as the economists put it, utility
and disutility."" 8 Evidently persuaded by these remarks, the Conseil d'Etat held that "a project serves a public purpose [utilit6
publique] only if the infringement on private property, the financial cost, and the disadvantages of a social character that it would
entail are not excessive in relation to the project's advancement of
the general welfare.""' A major redevelopment program for the eastern environs of Lille, including the creation of a university complex
for 30,000 students and a planned city of 25,000, was found to meet
the test, even though it meant demolishing eighty-eight apartment
buildings, some of which had just been completed.
Though Ville Nouvelle Est represents a sharp break with traditional judicial practice, the magnitude of the change is still debated
115. Commune de Cassis, [1968] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 189.
116. Ministre de 'Equipement et du Logement v. Fkd~ration de D~fense des Personnes
Concern~es par le Projet actuellement d6nomm6 "Ville Nouvelle Est,"[1971] Rec. Cons.
d'Et. 409, [1972] D. Jur. 194, [1971] J.C.P. II 16873, [1971] A.J.D.A. 421, [1972] R.D.P.
454, 142 REVUE ADMINISTRATIVE [REV. ADM.] 422 (1971).
117. Two commissaires du gouvernement are assigned from the membership of the
Conseil d'Etat to each panel of the Conseil d'Etat's judicial section. They attend the weekly
sessions at which the subsection's cases are discussed and a tentative solution reached, and
then present their independent views when the cases come up for final decision. Despite his
title, the commissaire du gouvernement in no sense represents the administration as party
to the dispute. On the contrary, he undertakes to clarify for the benefit of the court the
relevant issues in an objective and impartial manner, to synthesize past decisions on the
problem, and to recommend a result that does justice to the parties and promotes the public
interest. He may well propose a change in the Conseil d'Etat's case law and often disagrees
with the solution proposed by the rapporteurand tentatively adopted by the subsection. The
conclusions of the commissaire du gouvernement may become more influential than the
Conseil's decision itself since they alone discuss the facts, law, precedents, and arguments in
the extended fashion of Anglo-American judicial opinions. Conclusions in only the very leading decisions of the Conseil d'Etat are published in full in the law reviews and, less often, as
lengthy footnotes to decisions in the official reporter, the Recueil des Arr~ts du Conseil d'Etat,
also known as Recueil Lebon. There are commissaires du gouvernement on the tribunaux
administratifs as well, performing much the same function as those on the Conseil d'Etat.
On the office generally, see L. BROWN & J. GARNER, supra note 4, at 50.
118. Conclusions of commissaire du gouvernement Braibant, [1971] A.J.D.A. 463, 466.
See also M. LONG, supra note 64, at 567.
119. [1971] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 409, [1972] D. Jur. 194, [1971] J.C.P. U116873, [1971]
A.J.D.A. 421, [1972] R.D.P. 454, 142 REv. ADM. 422 (1971).
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at the Conseil d'Etat. According to the commissaire du
gouvernement in the case, the decision did no more than establish
finally a workable formula for enforcing the legal condition of utilit6
publique. According to a stricter view, the Conseil d'Etat very
nearly asserted the right to examine the opportunite of the government's use of eminent domain.120 Whichever view one adopts, the
Conseil d'Etat plainly departed from its tradition of literal textual
reading by developing a balancing test nowhere mentioned in the
relevant provisions of law.1 2' Henceforth, in eminent domain cases,
the administrative courts were to ensure not only that the project
served a public purpose, but also that, viewed as a whole, its benefits outweighed its costs.
Ville Nouvelle Est was not the first time the Conseil d'Etat had
imposed a proportionality requirement on the government. For example, when administrative action abridged certain fundamental
civil liberties, it would examine whether the abridgment was truly
necessary, in relation to the gravity of the situation. In a leading
1933 decision,' 22 the Conseil d'Etat held that the government could
not legally ban a political meeting if less restrictive means were
available at the time to cope with anticipated threats to public
order. Similarly, in a 1975 case, the Conseil extended its practice of
setting aside excessive limitations on freedom of speech, press, and
assembly to the area of film censorship, indicating that the Minister
of Information must weigh "the general interest for which [he] is
responsible . . .[against] the respect owed to civil liberties, particularly freedom of expression.' ' 23 The first approach to restrictions
on fundamental freedoms calls to mind a "least drastic means"
test' 4 and the second, a balancing test,'25 both of which have a place
in American constitutional law. While the Ville Nouvelle Est decision required no more than balancing, it appears to have been the
first occasion on which the Conseil d'Etat applied a proportionality
test of its own making outside a narrow category of preferred freedoms.
120. The term "super-contrble" has been used informally at the Conseil by some who
interpret the Ville Nouvelle Est approach as a review of opportunit6.
121. See Decree of June 6, 1959, [1959] J.O. 5724, [1959] D.L. 509.
122. Benjamin, [1933] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 541, [1933] D.P. m1354, [1934] S. Jur. 11 1.
123. Ministre de l'Information v. Soci~t6 Rome-Paris Films, [1975] Rec. Cons. d'Et.
57, [1975] A.J.D.A. 144. On the merits, the court ruled that "neither the situation depicted
in the film nor the conduct of the characters justified the general ban that was imposed." Id.
at 58, [1975] A.J.D.A. 145.
124. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964); Schneider v. New Jersey,
308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939).
125. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87-89 (1949); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 536 (1945).
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In a decision rendered shortly after Ville Nouvelle Est, the Conseil d'Etat permitted the government to condemn property for a new
autoroute linking Nice with the Italian border, in spite of the fact
that the project would necessitate partial demolition of the only
psychiatric hospital in the region. However, the Conseil could not
justify the construction of ramps and interchanges that would deprive the hospital of its open spaces and parking facilities, subject
it to severe traffic congestion, and rule out the possibility of future
expansion.2" The decision plainly included in the cost-benefit analysis certain considerations only remotely related to the purpose of
the project. Other controversial applications of the balancing test
followed, 27 leaving the impression that, while the active administration had traditionally been responsible for deciding the wisdom of
public works, the courts were assuming that function.
The Conseil d'Etat was not long in drawing the outer limits of
1
judicial involvement in eminent domain cases. In a 1974 decision, 2r
it declined to choose between alternate routes for a new expressway,
once it was satisfied that each of them separately met the Ville
Nouvelle Est balancing test; the government's choice of the cheaper
route was sustained, even though it meant a greater loss of agriculture acreage. According to the commissaire du gouvernement, the
court's preference for one fully justifiable route over another goes to
the opportunit6 and not the l~galit of administrative action,129 a
view that the Conseil d'Etat has since reaffirmed. 3 For the moment, then, the Conseil d'Etat has stopped short of applying to
eminent domain cases the stricter "least drastic means" test used
126. Socidt6 Civile Ste.-Marie de l'Assomption, [1972] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 657, [1973]
J.C.P. ]I 17470, [1972] A.J.D.A. 576, [1973] R.D.P. 843.
127. In a recent decision, the Conseil d'Etat set aside plans for a new airfield on the
grounds that the project did not respond to the real economic needs of the region, given its
high cost in relation to local revenues, the meager volume of air traffic and the availability
less than thirty miles away of the Poitiers airport. Grassin, [1973] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 598,
[1973] A.J.D.A. 586, [1974] A.J.D.A. 34.
128. Adam, [1974] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 145, [1974] A.J.D.A. 212.
129. Franc & Boyon, Chronique Gnrale de JurisprudenceAdministrativeFrangaise,
[1974] A.J.D.A. 192, 198.
130. In a later case, a group of landowners challenged a prefectoral order fixing the
course of a major electric energy line, the construction of which had been declared to be of
utilit6 publique. According to the Conseil d'Etat, the question whether
the choice of (petitioners'] property imposes an excessive burden on them which
other courses might have avoided . . . affects the validity of the order only if the
burden it imposes is not justified by the benefit to the public, . . . and here the
disadvantages of the course selected . . . are not excessive in comparsion with its
advantages.
Gorlier et Bonifay, [1975] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 54, [1975] A.J.D.A. 141. For prior case law, see
Groupement de D~fense des Riverains de la Route de l'Interieur, [1961] D. Jur. 663, [1961]
S. Jur. I 344, [1961] A.J.D.A. 646.
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to review alleged abridgments of certain civil liberties. While its
reluctance to go that far shows that there are varying degrees of
close supervision of administrative action, the margin of judgment
left to the administration in selecting sites for public works should
not be exaggerated. It is not, after all, a major concession for the
judge to sustain the government's preference among several sites,
each of which meets the Conseil d'Etat's delicate balancing test.
However, the Conseil d'Etat has not rushed to impose a balancing standard in all categories of cases. In the six years since Ville
Nouvelle Est, the Conseil has extended the test explicitly to only
one other area: variances from city planning regulations.' 3 According to the leading decision, variances must not only serve a public
interest, as required by statute, but "the prejudice caused by the
variance to the public interests that the planning regulation was
meant to protect [must not be] excessive in relation to the benefits
to the public thit the variance would offer." 3 '
It has already been suggested that the Conseil d'Etat's decision
to strengthen judicial review in eminent domain cases may have
been due to its belief that contrale normal over the application to
the facts of a concept as broad as utilit6 publique amounted to very
little review at all.13 3 Since massive highway and urban renewal
projects were uprooting whole communities on a scale never before
known, and since in some instances the real beneficiaries of the
projects seemed to be their promoters, the inability of the courts to
provide meaningful review acquired a new significance.
The decision to make a similar cost-benefit analysis in the case
of variances from city planning regulations reflected different fears.
Planning officials were thought to be issuing variances so casually
as to jeopardize the coherent urban development that the regulations were meant to promote, 34 a risk heightened by the fact that
131. The Conseil also seems to have introduced highly complex balancing considerations into a third area-dismissals from work of employees serving as union representatives-by imposing legal conditions of a-balancing type on the otherwise fully discretionary
authority of the government. S.A.F.E.R. d'Auvergne et Ministre de l'Agriculture v. Bernette,
[1976] A.J.D.A. 328, discussed in Nauwelaers & Fabius, supranote 86.
132. Ville de Limoges, [1973] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 530, [1973] J.C.P. II 17575, [1974]
R.D.P. 259, [1973] A.J.D.A. 481, 494. The Conseil had declined to take this step only the
previous year. Espanol, summarized at [1972] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 1204, 1257. In the Ville de.
Limoges case, the Conseil held that a variance permitting a builder to provide less open space
and fewer parking facilities than required by Limoges' city planning regulations was "not
based on a public interest justifying the prejudice to those interests the plan was meant to
protect." A recent challenge to the issuance of a variance that employed this analysis was
also successful. Association S.O.S. Paris, [1976] Rec. Cons. d'Et. (May 26, 1976).
133. See note 114 and accompanying text supra.
134. See Cabanes & Leger, Chronique G6nrale de Jurisprudence Administrative
Frangaise,[1973]A.J.D.A. 476, 486.
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existing law construed the government's failure to act upon a variance application within a stated period of time as tacit approval.13
The lack of standards was also held to account for alleged favoritism
in the granting of variances.13
It is doubtful that the Conseil d'Etat expected litigation under
its balancing test to weed out every ill-advised taking of private
property or every ill-considered variance. The Conseil may have
meant simply to call the legislature's attention to the need for remedial action. It most certainly hoped that the threat of judicial scrutiny would prod the government into more serious, principled, and
even-handed decision-making in areas where alleged abuses had
become a matter of grave public concern." 7
While the Conseil d'Etat may be asked in the years ahead to
introduce a balancing test into other areas of the law, more recent
cases suggest that it will not necessarily agree to do so. One illustration is the Conseil's 1975 decision expressly declining to weigh the
advantages and disadvantages of classifying property as an historic
or aesthetic site.1 38 A 1967 statute authorizes classification of
"natural monuments and sites whose conservation or preservation
would have artistic, historic, scientific, cultural or picturesque value
for the community.' ' 39 Classification of a site protects it from physical alteration without prior government approval. A group of landowners attacked a government decree classifying as a "picturesque
site" 20,000 acres of vineyard, forest, and other vegetation in the
southwest of France, by arguing that the region did not constitute
a "site," that it was in any case not a "picturesque site," and that
even if it were, the disadvantages of such a classification to thousands of landowners outweighed any attendant advantages to the
community. The Conseil d'Etat rejected the first two contentions,
but not before examining them closely not only in the light of the
facts, but also with reference to its own on-site inspection, to legislative history, and to prior administrative and judicial practice.'
Petitioners' third claim, however, received short shrift, as the
Conseil d'Etat refused "in its judicial capacity to weigh the disadf35. Id. at 480-81.
136. Id. at 481.
137. As to the preoccupations that led the Conseil d'Etat in S.A.F.E.R. d'Auvergne et
Ministre de l'Argiculture v. Bernette, [1976] A.J.D.A. 328, to introduce balancing elements
into judicial review of decisions authorizing employers to fire employees serving as union
respresentatives, see Nauwelaers & Fabius, supra note 86, at 306-07.
138. Dame Ebri et Union Syndicale de Dffense des Propri~taires du Massif de la Clape,
[1975] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 280, [1975] A.S.D.A. 311.
139. Law of Dec. 28, 1967, art. 3, [1967] J.O. 12856, [1968] D.S.L. 42.
140. Unpublished conclusions of commissaire du gouvernement Guillaume.
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vantages to landowners that the classification of their property
might bring." ' The Conseil gave no reason for its refusal, but it can
be assumed that it shared the view of its commissaire du
gouvernement that extension of the Ville Nouvelle Est balancing
' 2
test to this domain was "neither necessary nor even possible."'
According to the commissaire, standards in site classification had
not become as vague as those in cases of eminent domain, and
conventional judicial review was still adequate. He added that even
if the Conseil were willing to adopt the test, it could not be applied,
since the hardships which would result from classification under the
statute would not be known until the administrative policies on
permitting alteration of the landscape had evolved.
3.

Contr6le minimum

Theoretically, the courts do not review those determinations
that have been left to the government's pouvoir discr~tionnaire.If
applicable law does not tie government action to the existence of
certain legal conditions then, unless the courts see fit to infer conditions of their own, they have no choice, according to theory, but
43
to limit their review to contr6le minimum.'
But even if the minimum, such review is scarcely minimal. In
the Barel case,' the commissaire du gouvernement suggested that
"the minimum scope of review to which the administrative judge
can be reduced is one that ensures that administrative action has
been taken for a proper public purpose, is consistent with applicable
rules of law, and rests on accurate basic facts."'45 The Conseil d'Etat
expressly adopted his view by holding that no grant of discretion can
deprive the judge of his authority to review' for incompetence, vice
de forme, d~tournement de pouvoir, violation de la loi, or erreur de
fait.' But neither the commissaire nor the Conseil was prepared to
suggest that contr6le minimum could reach the administration's
application of the law to the facts, for judicial review of such an
issue was considered incompatible with pouvoir discr~tionnaire.
Rarely is a government official wholly free of statutory or regulatory constraints in determining whether, when, and how to act.
However, the draftsmen of statutes and regulations do occasionally
141. [1975] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 280, 281.
142. Unpublished conclusions of commissaire du gouvernement Guillaume.
143. See note 74 and accompanying text supra.
144. [1954] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 308, [1954] D. Jur. 594, [1954] S. Jur. 111 97, [1954]
R.D.P. 509, [1954] A.J.D.A. 396.
145. [1954] R.D.P. 509, 521.
146. [1954] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 308, 309, [1954] D. Jur. 594.
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refrain from imposing legal conditions on an official's pouvoir
discr~tionnairein such matters as the granting of favors or subsidies,'47 or the choice of persons with whom the government shall do
business.'48 More often, a decision is subordinated only in part to
legal conditions, as the example of civil service sanctions shows: the
decision to discipline a civil servant depends on the existence of
fault and is therefore subject to contr6le normal; the choice of sanctions is discretionary and subject to contr6le minimum.'49
In fact, the Conseil d'Etat, for prudential reasons, sometimes
exercises corE role minimum even where legal conditions are stated.
The two broad categories of decisions in which it has instructed the
administrative courts to curtail their. review have a familiar ring to
American ears, for they echo considerations that we, too, hear in this
connection: first, the concern that judicial intervention may compromise national security interests, and second, the concern that
sound judicial review may at times require special technical knowledge that the judge lacks. When the courts turn to contr6le minimum for reasons like these, they do so not out of respect for statutory or regulatory language, but out of a sense of their own limitations.
(a) National Security Cases
Reduction in the review of national security matters seems to
be episodic, partly because national security matters themselves
tend to be episodic. For example, the Conseil d'Etat refrained from
full review over internments imposed under a 1944 regulation effective during the period between the liberation and the end of hostilities.' 0 It took the same position in connection with restraints imposed during the 19552 Algerian state of emergency"' and the subse5
quent Algerian war.'
147. See Mouvement Rlgional des Intellectuels Frangais pour la Dffense de Ia Paix,
summarized at [1956] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 633, 734; Verdeil, [1950] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 256.
Included in this category have been decisions giving ranks within the Resistance their equivalents in the French military hierarchy. Chillou de Saint-Albert, [1952] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 162.
148. See Ministre de l'Education Nationale v. Rousset, [1969] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 532
(establishment of the list of candidates for a government post); Reboul, [1969] Rec. Cons.
d'Et. 156 (decision not to fill a vacant government position); Mirambeau, [1967] Rec. Cons.
d'Et. 272 (removal of an administrative official for non-disciplinary reasons); Ballanger,
[1931] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 160, [1931] D.P. 111 11 (exclusion of bidders from competition for
government contracts).
149. See note 80 and accompanying text supra.
150. Frocrain, [1948] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 97, applying Ordonnance of June 27, 1944,
[1944] J.O. 536, [1944] J.C.P. mI 8786.
151. Dame Bourokba, [1955] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 590.
152. See, e.g., Ministre de l'Interieur v. Livet, [1964] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 534, [1965]
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More recently, the Conseil d'Etat has shown greater interest in
reviewing the application of the law to the facts in national security
matters, at least when the law gives it a reasonably precise legal
condition to enforce. In a noted 1965 decision, 51 3 the Conseil upheld
the government's dissolution of the Committee of Friendship for
French Algeria, but not before reviewing for itself the question of
whether that body had "manifested solidarity [with groups] actively resisting the reestablishment of order in Algeria."' 54
Even in calmer times, however, the Conseil d'Etat has invoked
contrle minimum in its review of certain routine administrative
decisions related to national security, such as refusals to issue or
renew a passport,'5 5 restrictions on travel, 56 and denials of "good
morals certificates" to candidates for sensitive government positions. 5 7
The national security exception seems to apply most regularly,
however, to restrictions imposed upon aliens. These restrictions
have included orders barring the entry of foreigners into France,'
refusals to renew a carte de s~jour,159 denials of permission to foreigners to reside in certain areas,' expulsions from French soil,' 6'
D.S. Jur. 668; Grange, [1959] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 856.
153. Association Comit6 d'Entente pour l'Alg~rie Franqaise, [1965] Rec. Cons. d'Et.
73.
154. Ordonnance no. 60-1856 of Dec. 22, 1960, issued pursuant to law of Feb. 4, 1960,
[1960] J.C.P. 11 25366. The commissairedu gouvernement had urged the Conseil to exercise
full review:
However broad, this definition. . . is clearly distinguishable from those formulas
over which we exercise limited review, since it characterizes the punishable activity
both in terms of its object (manifesting solidarity with a banned group) and its
means (public declaration or action). . . . This is precise enough to prevent our
review over the legal characterization of fact from becoming a control of
opportunit6.
Conclusions of commissaire du gouvernement Galmot, [1965] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 73, 80. The
Conseil also adopted his view, on the merits, that the Committee had shown "solidarity" by
issuing declarations of support for the dissolved Front for French Algeria, had proclaimed
itself its representative in metropolitan France and had recruited on its behalf. Id. at 81-83.
Of course, the Conseil d'Etat decided as matters of law whether the statute was limited in
scope to groups banned for activities in connection with the Algerian crisis and whether it
contemplated dissolution based on solidarity shown toward a group even before it had been
dissolved. Id. at 75-77.
155. See Car, [1960] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 319, [1960] A.J.D.A. 353; Imbach, [1948] Rec.
Cons. d'Et. 215, [1949] D. Jur. 226.
156. See Matarasso, summarized at [1971] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 920, 1138, 1153; Douzon,
[1968] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 517; Manville, [1964] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 118; Pradines, [1960] Rec.
Cons. d'Et. 1078.
157. See Haddad, [1952] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 483.
158. See Markon, [1952] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 524.
159. See Epoux Bonjean, [1964] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 73, 74.
160. See Saliares, summarized at [1960] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 1071; Dame de SavitchRitchgorsky, [1953] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 281.
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8 ' and prohibition
bans on associations of foreigners in France,"
of the
sale and distribution of foreign periodicals.8 3 The Conseil d'Etat
apparently bases the scope of its review over some of these measures
entirely upon whether or not the persons involved are French. For
example, the administrative courts have never thought it beyond
their competence to decide whether an association of French nationals may be banned," 4 or whether the sale and distribution of a
domestic publication may be prohibited in the interest of national
security.' 5 Indeed, in view of the fact that the courts are now prepared to use a "least drastic means" test in reviewing restraints on
fundamental liberties, even without statutory authority,' 8 the application of contr6le minimum to the dissolution of foreign associations and the censorship of foreign publications is particularly striking. The foreign element, as such, would not seem to render judicial
review technically or legally more difficult, but it may be thought
to make review unwise. The commissaire du gouvernement in a
leading 1955 case'"7 -explained that in national security cases "we
are in a domain where the safeguard of national interests or of
Frenchmen's rights abroad requires the government to bring subversive activities to an end and to respond to hostile acts committed
against the person or property of Frenchmen abroad."' 6
161. See Hamon ben Brahim, [1955] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 168; Eckert, [1952] Rec. Cons.
d'Et. 467; Meyer, [1952] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 312.
162. See Association Franco-Russe dit Rousky-Dom, [1955] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 202, 43
REv. ADM. 404 (1955); Delannoy et Geiger, [1943] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 74.
163. See Monus, [1973] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 527, 528; Ministre de l'Intkrieur v. Girodias
et Soci~t6 The Olympia Press, summarized at [1958] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 968, [1959] S. Jur.
1 69; Joudoux et Riaux, [1954] Rec. Cons d'Et. 346.
164. See, e.g., Krivine et Frank, [1970] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 499; Boussel, [1970] Rec.
Cons. d'Et. 504, [1970] D. Jur. 633, [1970] J.C.P. U 16672, [1970] A.J.D.A. 607; Association Parti National Populaire, [1936] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 1040, [1937] D.P. Il 14.
165. See, e.g., Schroedt, [1970] Reec. Cons. d'Et. 501; Association Enbata, [1968] Rec.
Cons. d'Et. 28; Hernandez, [1963] Reec. Cons. d'Et. 947; Socist6 Nouvelle d'Imprim~rie
d'Edition et de Publicit6, [1951] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 553.
166. See note 122 and accompanying text supra.
167. Association Franco-Russe dit Rousky-Dom, [1955] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 202, 43 Ray.
ADM. 408 (1955).
168. Conclusions of commissaire du gouvernement Heumann, current President of the
Conseil d'Etat, section du contentieux, 43 REv. ADM. 404, 408 (1955). In the case, an organization formed to aid Russian refugees in France challenged a dissolution order issued by
the Minister of the Interior. The Conseil d'Etat dismissed the claims of incompetence and
d~tournement de pouvoir, and accepted the findings of fact that the organization had hung
a portrait of Stalin in its premises, had kept books on the Communist Party in its library,
had maintained contacts with the Soviet Red Cross, and had harbored suspected communists. However, with respect to the allegation that these facts had been improperly characterized, the Conseil replied that "it is for the Minister of the Interior to determine, as he has
done, whether the organization's activities may compromise national security, and his judgment may not be reviewed by the Conseil d'Etat." [1955] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 202, 203, 43 Rv.
ADM. 404, 408 (1955).
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One recent decision, however, indicates a change in this category of cases. A 1945 ordinance permits the Minister of the Interior
in cases of "absolute urgency" to deprive a foreigner of the hearing
to which he is otherwise entitled before deportation on national
security grounds.' 9 Contr6le minimum was traditionally applied to
the question of whether such urgency existed.'7 ° In 1970, following
some indications of change,' 7 ' the Conseil d'Etat set aside a deportation order on the ground that the minister had not made the showing
of urgency required to justify his failure to provide a hearing.'7 2 Not
unlike American courts, the Conseil is somewhat more ready to step
in where the government's alleged misconduct consists of disregarding the requirements of fair procedure designed to give the individual an opportunity to be heard.
(b)

Technical Judgments

When the administrative courts relax the scope of review over
highly technical matters, they do so neither because a statute or a
regulation says so, nor because they find the subject too sensitive
for judicial intervention, but because in their view they are incapable of doing otherwise. "It is more honest," suggests President
Odent, "for the judge to admit that he is incapable of providing
effective review, and to step aside, than to give the illusion of re73
view."
In timid hands, modesty in technical matters could mean
chronic judicial abdication, for nearly every modern-day decision of
the government has a greater or lesser technical component. In fact,
most of the cases in which the courts disqualify themselves from
reviewing the legal characterizaton of the facts on this ground fall
7
into a few well-defined categories. 1
Medical questions form one such group. For example, the
courts have applied contr6le minimum to the question whether the
169. Ordonnance of Nov. 2, 1945, [1945] J.O. 7225, [1946] S.L. 81.
170. See Eckert, [1952] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 467.
171. See generally Franc & Boyon, Chronique Gn~rale de JurisprudenceAdministrative Franqaise,[1973] A.J.D.A. 577, 580.
172. -Mihoubi
Mohand Tayeb, [1970] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 25. For another example of
greater activity by the Conseil d'Etat in the area of national security, see Soci6t6 Union
Africaine de Presse, [1966] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 276, [1966] J.C.P. II 14805.
173. R. ODENT, supra note 39, at 1563-64. Certain American judges would seem to take
a similar view of the matter: "Better no judicial review at all than a charade that gives the
imprimatur without the substance of judicial confirmation that the agency is not acting
unreasonably." Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 69 (D.C. Cir.) (Leventhal, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
174. M. LroUtNEUR,supranote 1, at 164; Letourneur, L'Etendue du Contrale duJuge
de l'Excks de Pouvoir,16 CoNs. D'ET. E. & Docs. 51, 59-60. (1962).
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exercise of osteopathy and chiropractice should be reserved to licensed medical doctors, 175 or whether a professor of hydrology and
climatology is qualified to serve as an authority on therapeutics on
an academic examining board. 176 The courts have seldom reviewed
the merits of decisions to deny licenses for the manufacture of pharmaceutical products177 or to forbid their advertisement.17 8 Examples
could be multiplied of cases in which the Conseil d'Etat has concluded that a medical determination "rests on facts which have not
been shown to be incorrect and whose characterization . . . is not
'17
subject to debate before the Conseil d'Etat.
Problems of rural land redistribution (remembrement rural)
have also struck the Conseil d'Etat as particularly inappropriate for
judicial review. Legislation stemming from the time of the German
Occupation during the Second World War authorizes local boards
to impose compulsory exchanges of agricultural holdings in order to
produce a more rational and efficient use of land.18 It provides that
each property owner shall receive land equivalent, in terms of real
productivity for each type of cultivation, to the land that he has
been asiked to give up. The sharp differences of opinion aroused by
these exchanges soon produced a spate of litigation. The Conseil
d'Etat decided to curtail review by the tribunaux administratifsof
decisions of the local boards on the number and type of land catego175. See Belig, [1962] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 376.
176. See Debray, [1968] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 610.
177. See Soci6t des Laboratoires Conan, [1952] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 133.
178. See Soci6t6 des Laboratoires du Bac, [1948] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 100. The Conseil
d'Etat rendered two decisions on the same day with respect to the same drug manufacturer,
one declining jurisdiction and the other agreeing to examine the merits of an advertising ban.
In the first case, the court observed that "no legal text. . . limits the power of the administration to refuse an advertising permit in the interest of public health . . . and the technical
committee's evaluation of the risks presented by the proposed advertisement is not subject
to review by the Conseil d'Etat." Socidt6 des Laboratoires du Bac, [1948] Rec. Cons. d'Et.
100. In the second, it held that "in not citing the risks to public health which the advertisement poses, the technical committee made it impossible for the Conseil d'Etat to see whether
or not withdrawal of the permit was legally justified." Soci~t6 des Laboratoires du Bac,
[1948] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 101. As is its custom, the Conseil made no effort to reconcile the
cases. But there was a difference: in the first, the administration merely denied petitioner's
application for an advertising permit, while in the second it withdrew permission previously
granted. See R. ODENT, supra note 39, at 1564.
179. Socit des Laboratoires Conan, [1952] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 133, 134 (denial of a
license to manufacture a drug). Other examples include Ischlondsky et Soci~t6 Laboratoires
Biodyne, [1971] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 14 (withdrawal of a license to manufacture a drug because
the licensee failed to perform clinical studies that had been contemplated); F~dration
Nationale des Syndicats Pharmaceutiques de France, [1967] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 180, [1967]
A.J.D.A. 401 (assessment of risks in making medicine containing poisonous substances
available without prescription); Soci6t6 Toni, [1951] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 236 (evaluation of
the toxicity of hair lotion).
180. Law of Mar. 9, 1941, [1941] J.O. 1658,119411 D.A.L. 206.
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ries to be established, ' on how to classify individual parcels among
these categories,' 82 on whether certain property forms part of a
"center of farming operations" and is therefore immune from compulsory exchange,' and, above all, on whether the land given up
and the land received by a farmer are equivalent in real productivity."' Undoubtedly, several considerations lay behind the Conseil
d'Etat's preference for contr6le minimum: the vast number of
claims, the existence of specialized local boards, the availability to
the boards of impartial experts, the possibility of appeal to higher
officials, and not least, the confusion that would be caused by set'
ting aside a redistribution plan years after it has gone into effect. 85
Still, the sheer complexity of the problem was an important factor.
The Conseil d'Etat has in the meantime decided to bring some
of the issues connected with remembrement ruralunder full judicial
review,188 while still leaving many outside. The Conseil's practice of
singling out certain aspects of a technical matter for contr6le normal
is not limited to the land redistribution cases. In other areas, too, it
has overruled precedent selectively, permitting the courts to resume
full review over those aspects of a problem that no longer strike it
17
as too difficult or too complex for them to handle.
A third area in which the courts restrict judicial review on
technical grounds includes cases calling into question the operational requirements of the administration and the capacity of indi181.

See Ministre de l'Agriculture v. David, summarized at [1963] Rec. Cons. d'Et.

819.
182. See Demoiselle Vaunereau, summarized at [1963] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 817; LavefveOrbinot, [1960] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 730, [1961] A.J.D.A. 108.
183. See Dame Huard, summarized at [1959] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 906, overruled in Dame
Veuve Pinon, [1963] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 79.
184. See Pinet, [1959] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 254. But see note 216 and accompanying text
infra.
185. Vincent, L'ErreurManifeste d'Apprkciation, 142 Rav. ArM. 407, 410 (1971).
186. See Dame Veuve Pinon, [1963] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 79, overruling Dame Huard
[1959] Rec. Cons, d'Et. 906, by making fully reviewable the determination that property is
or is not a "center of operations"; Levrier, [1969] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 374, [1969] A.J.D.A. 63334, overruling Secr~taire d'Etat i l'Agriculture v. Jocquart, [1959] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 395, by
making fully reviewable the question whether the distance separating farm lands from the
center of operations has been reduced.
187. For example, the Conseil d'Etat exercises only contr6leminimum over the question
whether a young man is physically fit for military service. Ministre des Armies v. Bachex,
[1968] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 628, [1969] A.J.D.A. 20, 21, [1969] RD.P. 709, 22 REv. Arm. 314
(1969), cited in Dewost & Denoix de Saint-Marc, Chronique G~nrale de Jurisprudence
Administrative Franqaise,[1969] A.J.D.A. 20, 21. This may represent a retreat in the scope
of review as compared to prior case law, e.g. Hermann, [1967] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 394. See note
276 infra. However, the Conseil d'Etat exercises contr6le normalover whether a draftee and
sole family support "is in a serious social situation" entitling him to an exemption from
military service. Gardarein, [1969] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 55, [1969] A.J.D.A. 157.

1977]

JUDICIAL REVIEW IN FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

vidual civil servants to meet them. Such matters are thought to call
for judgments which "only those who know the practical working
conditions of the particular office or the merits of the individual
official under consideration can bring to bear." ' Thus, the Conseil
d'Etat has declined to review the evaluation of a civil servant's
record by his superiors for purposes of appointment or promotion,"9
the decision whether a post entails such risks to health as to entitle
its occupant to early retirement,'9 ° or a finding that a given ministry
is or is not so understaffed as to justify eliminating leaves of absence.19' While disputes frequently arise under legislation requiring
the government to provide a civil servant whose position has been
abolished an "equivalent post" for which he is qualified, or if none
is available, just compensation,' - the Conseil d'Etat has time and
again limited its review on the equivalence issue to controle
minimum. 193
The following samples provide an idea of the range of controversies the Conseil d'Etat is said to have avoided on account of their
technical character: a secondary school principal's recommendation
that a pupil be placed on a different academic track, 9 ' the maritime
administration's refusal to approve an oyster-culture concession,'9 5
a rating by the National Institute of Appellations d'Origine of the
quality of wines,' 98 a prefect's finding that the network of agricultural cooperatives in a certain sector satisfies the needs of local
farmers,'97 the rejection by the Com6die Francaise of a certain theatrical piece,'98 and the government's veto of a municipal council
resolution changing a local street name.'99 Not all of these decisions
could have been predicted. Moreover, while deference to adminis188. R. ODENT, supra note 39, at 1566.
189. See Corbellini, [1970] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 551; Demoiselle Jacob, [1966] Rec. Cons.
d'Et. 580; Lack, [1961] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 511.
190. See Association Amicale des Ing~nieurs du Corps de l'Afronautique, [1935] Rec.
Cons. d'Et. 18; Association des Officiers des Eaux et F6rets, [1934] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 1133.
191. See Chauveau, [1967] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 128.
192. Law of Apr. 28, 1952, art. 83, 84, [1952] J.O. 4349, [1952] D.L. 167.
193. See Gayrard, [1970] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 181; Picq, [1966] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 1069;
Demoiselle Cavaignac, summarized at [1961] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 319; M61am~de, [1951] Rec.
Cons. d'Et. 226, [1951] D. Jur. 453.
194. See Neher, [1965] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 648; Gauthier, [1969] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 21.
195. See Guintini, [1968] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 353.
196. See Syndicat Agricole et Viticole de Lalande et de Pomerol, [1960] Rec. Cons.
d'Et. 529.
197. See Cooperative des Propriftaires Rcoltants de la Champagne D61imit~e, [1969]
Rec. Cons. d'Et. 514.
198. See Palaprat, [1954] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 118, [1954] J.C.P. H 8205, [1954]
A.J.D.A. 277, [1954] R.D.P. 1072.
199. See Ville de Lisieux, [1953] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 8, [1953] D. Jur. 391.
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trative expertise may explain the wine decision, for example, others
surely stem from very different considerations: the decision in the
oyster-culture case derived from the notion that a concession is more
of a privilege than a right, while the street name case can be attributed to the sheer absence of objective criteria.
Still, there are a greater number of more or less technical issues
that the administrative courts do in fact decide. To illustrate, in one
case an optician sought to be exempted from certain professional
licensing procedures on the basis of a statutory exemption for those
opticians who could establish to the satisfaction of the authorities
that they had practiced the profession for a minimum period of time
before the procedures went into effect."' Petitioner's application
was denied because, although he had sold eyeglasses for the requisite period of time, he allegedly lacked sufficient experience in their
manufacture. The tribunal administratifof Limoges, finding the
optician's experience adequate, set aside the earlier administrative
ruling, and the government appealed on the ground that the court
should not have substituted its own judgment for that of the board.
The Conseil d'Etat adopted the view of the commisssaire du
gouvernement to the effect that "the board's findings are not too
technical in character for the court to review," and sustained the
lower court's right "to verify whether the legal condition for practicing the profession . . . was met by the interested party." ' On the
merits, the commissaire agreed, in the light of the legislative history, with the board's view that the profession had both commercial and technical aspects. However, upon examining petitioner's
practice in some detail, the commissaire found that he had had
adequate experience in each," 2 and the Conseil d'Etat so held.0 '
200. Law of June 5, 1944, [1944] J.C.P. I8626, [1944] Gaz. Pal. 192.
201. Lalo, [1964] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 435, 436, [1965] A.J.D.A. 127, 128. In another
example, petitioners challenged a redistribution of forest lands for greater productivity on the
grounds that the government improperly included certain non-forest property, notably two
ponds, in the exchange. The commissaire du gouvernement urged the Conseil d'Etat to
intervene on the merits despite their technical character; since "[ain important aspect of
the legality of the decision, [viz.] the boundaries of forest groups, does not present insurmountable technical difficulties." Conclusions of commissaire du gouvernement Rigaud,
[1968] A.J.D.A. 18, 23. The Conseil d'Etat decided not only the conditions under which
ponds could legitimately be included in forest groups, but also whether the two ponds in
question met them. Epoux Domm~e, [1967] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 382, [1967] A.J.D.A. 673.
While the first question involved matters of legislative history and common sense, the second
required a close analysis of the facts of the case.
202. Conclusions of commissaire du gouvernement Braibant, [1965] A.J.D.A. 126, 127203.

Lalo, [1964] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 435, 436, [1965] A.J.D.A. 127, 128.
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Erreur manifeste

Within the last ten to fifteen years, commentators began to
notice that errors were occurring in administrative decisions less
often as mistakes of law or of fact than as mistaken applications of
the law to the facts.2 4 But it was in precisely this aspect of decision20 5
making that contr6le minimum most restricted judicial review.
Considering that the increasing delegation of discretionary authority and the growing number and importance of technical decisions
were driving the courts more than ever to the use of contr6le
minimum in place of contrble normal, the gap in judicial review
took on great practical significance.
It may be assumed that misjudgments in applying the law to
the facts are most often innocent. However, in certain areas governed by contr6le minimum, it appeared that the government might
have a special interest which could prevent it from acting fairly. For
example, a civil servant whose position had just been abolished
might be offered a plainly inferior post, prompting a refusal and
thus permitting the government to avoid its obligation to pay compensation. In another area, the land redistribution boards, which
are composed of local farmers, have occasionally been suspected of
hostility toward nonresident landowners. 8 The courts could not
correct abuses like these without a meaningful form of review; neither could they deter them. While justice might still be served in
individual instances by straining the meaning of the terms "error
of law" or "error of fact," such efforts were subject to criticism as a
matter of logic and principle.0 7 Vague notions of unreasonableness
or arbitrariness would have allowed the courts to provide at least
some measure of review over the legal characterization of fact, but
they had little basis in French legal thought or practice. It was in
this setting that the Conseil d'Etat developed the theory of erreur
manifeste.
In an otherwise unexceptional 1953 decision, the Conseil d'Etat
first raised the possibility that, even in an area governed by contr6le
minimum, error in applying the law to the facts might be
204. M. LEroURNEuR, supra note 1, at 148.
205. See note 146 and accompanying text supra. President Odent suggests that the
administrative courts "were not unaware of the fact that their review of the facts was very
superficial and therefore very ineffective when reduced to the minimum of review over their
sheer physical correctness." R. ODENT, supra note 39, at 1569.
206. See Vincent, L'Erreur Manifeste d'Appr~ciation, 142 REv. Awm. 407, 410 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as VINCENT].
207. See Desjardins (June 13, 1951) (unpublished opinion of Cons. d'Et.). See VINcENT,
supra note 206, at 411.
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"manifeste" and subject to review and reversal by the administrative judge."0 8 The question was a classic one: could a position be
found in the Ministry of Overseas Territories that was equivalent to
the recently abolished office of "administrator for Indochina"? But,
instead of declining to adldress the issue, the Conseil d'Etat concluded that "the absence of an equivalent post appears manifestly
from the Ministry's rules of organization." ' 9 The use of language
was intriguing, since just two years earlier the Conseil had adopted
the commissaire du gouvernement's categorical view that in such
cases, "what is at stake is simply the organization and operation of
the public service, a matter for which the Minister alone is responsible, and one that he alone should decide." '
Over the next several years, the Conseil d'Etat referred to
erreur manifeste in only a handful of cases, practically all of which
dealt with the issue of job equivalence in government service, and
none of which resulted in a finding that such an error had been
committed."' In 1962, for the first time, the Conseil granted relief
to a civil servant whose position had been abolished, when the government failed to offer him a vacant and "manifestly equivalent"
post. 21 2 Soon thereafter, the Conseil extended the idea of erreur

manifeste to certain issues in the area of rural land redistribution,
such as
whether two
parcels of land were
equivalent in real produc23
4
215

tivity,

in size," or in category of use.

The notion of erreur manifeste lends itself especially well to
questions of equivalence, since it enables the judge to look at concrete data and reverse administrative action in cases of obvious
disparity, without becoming too deeply enmeshed in complex and
technical material. It is probably significant that in its earliest deci208. See Denizet, [1953] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 489.
209. Id.
210. Milam~de, [1951] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 226, [1951] D. Jur. 453.
211. See Association des Fonctionnaires Ch~rifiens du Cadre Sup~rieur de
l'Administration Centrale du Maroc, [1963] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 294; Carpentier, [1962] Rec.
Cons. d'Et. 17; Lagrange, [1961] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 121.
212. See Commune de Montfermeil v. Foittier, [1962] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 304, [1962]
A.J.D.A. 571.
213. See, e.g., Guy6, [1970] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 652, [1971] A.J.D.A. 54, [1971] R.D.P.
517; Ministre de l'Agriculture v. Peyron, [1966] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 592; Demoiselle Achart,
[1961] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 476.
214. See Gindre, [1968] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 669.
215. See, e.g., Ministre de l'Agriculture v. Quiniou, [1968] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 850; Ministre de l'Agriculture v. David, [1963] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 819; Demoiselle Achart, [1961] Rec.
Cons. d'Et. 476. The Conseil also began reviewing under this standard the determination that
the net distance separating a farmer's fields from his center of operations was no greater after
than before the exchange of lands. Boursier, [1963] Rec. Cons. d'Et.487. But, as noted, the
Conseil later shifted to contr6le normal over this issue. See note 186, supra.
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sions the Conseil d'Etat used the word "manifeste" to describe the
equivalence, not the error: it meant to set aside administrative action, not so much because a serious error had been committed, but
because the error that was committed was physically, perhaps even
mathematically, unmistakeable. In one case, 2 6 a farmer had surren-

dered land valued at 21,963 productivity units in exchange for land
valued at 21,735, sustaining barely over a one per cent loss. The fact
that the Conseil d'Etat ruled in his favor suggests that the magnitude of error was not its primary consideration. Because it appeared
to ask the courts to do no more than note the obvious, the doctrine
of erreur manifeste did not seem likely to draw them too far into
areas where they did not belong.
However, the idea of erreur manifeste had great potential for
expansion. Interpreted liberally, it could reach flagrant misjudgments in the legal characterization of fact in every field where previously the judge did not review the issue at all. So construed, erreur
manifeste might begin to correspond in breadth to the notion of
unreasonableness in American law. Despite early doubts about the
value and universality of the doctrine," 7 erreur manifeste has since
been invoked by the Conseil d'Etat in just about every area of the
law where the courts exercise contr6le minimum. The Conseil first
extended it to issues of government employment other than job
equivalences: for example, the question whether a civil servant had
shown sufficient professional aptitude to earn a promotion. 28 The

doctrine was also applied to a number of medical deteminations,
21
including a conscript's physical fitness for military service.
216. Charton, [1960] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 901; accord Secr~taire d'Etat v. Gesbert, [1960]
Rec. Cons. d'Et. 162. See generally Galabert & Gentot, ChroniqueGnrale de Jurisprudence
Administrative Frangaise, [1962] A.J.D.A. 552, 553 [hereinafter cited as GALABERT &
GmroT]; Galabert, Le Remembrement Foncier,[1961] A.J.D.A. 62, 67.
217.

Kornprobst, L'Erreur Manifeste, DALLoz CHRONIQUE 121, 122 (1965) [hereinafter

cited as KORNPROBST]. See also GALABERT & GENTYr, supra note 216, at 552.
218. See Maurel, [1963] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 119. In other rulings, the Conseil d'Etat
reviewed for erreurmanifeste the evaluation made by public hospital authorities of one of its
therapists in deciding whether to renew her contract, Dame Gontarbert, [1964] Rec. Cons.
d'Et. 431, [1965] D.S. Jur. 9, and the decision whether a member of a tribunal administratif
had been compensated adequately for special services he had been asked to render, Boufrioua,
[19661 Rec. Cons. d'Et. 317.
219. See Ministre des Armies v. Bachex, [1968] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 628, [1969] A.J.D.A.
20, [1969] R.D.P. 709, 711, 22 REv. ADM. 314 (1969). The Conseil also applied the doctrine
of erreurmanifeste to the decision by which a doctor is or is not placed on the liste departementale de notorit6, entitling him to charge higher medical fees than otherwise permitted,
because of his exceptional professional qualifications. Rougemont, [1967] Rec. Cons. d'Et.
240, [1968] D. Jur. 201, [1968] A.J.D.A. 48; See also Villard, [1964] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 256,
[1965] D.S. Jur. 494, [1964] S. Jur. Im 172, [1964] A.J.D.A. 294, 314. See also Sieri, [1976)
Rec. Cons. d'Et. (Mar. 3, 1976) (whether an individual made a sufficient showing of
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To this point, the Conseil d'Etat had applied the doctrine only
in cases where it, and not the legislature, had imposed contrale
minimum on the courts. It is understandable that the Conseil would
feel free in that situation to reassert a measure of review as soon as
it found a suitable judicial tool for doing so. A more delicate problem would arise if*the courts applied erreur manifeste to areas in
which an absence of legal conditions indicated legislative intent to
confer unfettered discretion on the administration. In such areas,
the courts presumably cannot review the legal characterization of
the facts-even by the modest standard of erreur manifestewithout thwarting legislative purpose. Understandably, the
Conseil d'Etat had more serious reservations about reaching into
these areas. " "
Nonetheless, the Conseil d'Etat was soon invoking erreur
manifeste as a standard for reviewing what had been considered
purely discretionary acts of the government. " ' A few examples
training and experience in fitting artificial eyes to exempt him from certain licensing procedures.
Judge Leventhal has made a similar analysis:
A court does not depart from its proper function when it undertakes a study of
the record, hopefully perceptive, even as to the evidence on technical and specialized matters, for this enables the court to penetrate to the underlying decisions of
the agency, to satisfy itself that the agency has exercised a reasoned discretion, with
reasons that do not deviate from or ignore the ascertainable legislative intent.
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403
U.S. 923 (1971).
220. KORNPROBST, supra note 217, at 123. But see GALABERT & GFNTOrT, supra note 216,
at 552.
221. Among the more recent extensions of the doctrine of erreur manifeste, two have
received considerable attention. The Conseil has agreed to review under that standard the
government's apparently discretionary authority to license a nuclear reactor. Herr, [1975]
Rec. Cons. d'Et. 162. The courts now also review for erreur manifeste the percentage fixed
for mandatory payments [taxes parafiscales] imposed on importers or producers of certain
goods. In its first such ruling, it upheld the rate of taxation on beef, pork, and lamb products,
Soci~t6 Anonyme "Quiblier et Fils" et F~d6ration Nationale de l'Industrie et des Commerces
en Gros des Viandes, [19751 Rec. Cons. d'Et. 191, [1976] A.J.D.A. 213, but thereafter it
set aside as "manifestly excessive" the fixed monthly finance charge imposed for delay in
payment of the tax on importing and processing prunes, Centre Technique des Conserves de
Produits Agricoles v. Etablissement Gr6gori, [1976] Rec. Cons. d'Et. (May 28, 1976).
Other recent decisions of the Conseil recognize the applicability of the doctrine of erreur
manifeste to the government's otherwise discretionary decisions, including: ordering the consolidation of a town with adjacent towns, Association pour la Protection des Intere4ts des
Habitants d'Anthy-sur-L'man, [1975] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 255; selecting a certain design for
the new Pompidou Center of Art and Culture at Plateau Beaubourg in Paris, Bergerioux,
[1976] Rec. Cons. d'Et. - (Jan. 23, 1976), [1976] A.J.D.A. 420; and refusing a mutual
benefit society authorization to establish a pharmacy for its members, Ministre de la Sante
v. Union D~partementale des Soci~tes Mutualistes de la Gironde, [1976] Rec. Cons. d'Et.
52, [1976] A.J.D.A. 255. See also Societ Distillerie Brabant, [1969] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 264,
[1970] D. Jur. 762, [1969] A.J.D.A. 645, [1969] R.D.P. 1127 (application of anti-dumping
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should suggest the wide range of these decisions. In one, the Conseil
applied the test to denials by prefects of the permission required by
law to demolish existing structures, even though the prefects
seemed to have been given-unfettered discretion in the matter."' In
a 1970 ruling, the Conseil d'Etat characterized as erreur manifeste
the denial of financial aid under a law authorizing the government,
but not obliging it, to assist the "most disadvantaged" among
French repatriates, 23 where the applicant was a poor, ill, sixty-nine
year-old widow who was without relatives and lived in an apartment
241
needing major renovations.
The application of the erreur manifeste idea that aroused the
greatest interest was in the area of the issuance of building permits.
The Conseil d'Etat's practice had been to exercise contr6le normal
over the government's decision to deny a permit because the proposed structure would impair public health, safety, or environmental interests, but to exercise contrle minimum over the decision to
grant one. 221 The assumption was that permit applications could not
be rejected unless the proposed construction would endanger health,
safety, or environmental interests, but that they could be granted
even in the face of such dangers. Naturally, this view of the law
discouraged environmental interest groups and even neighbors from
challenging the issuance of a building permit, no matter how negative its impact on the surrounding area. The 1968 Plage de
Pampelonne case 221 introduced the idea of erreur manifeste to this
area. In that case, neighbors had complained that a massive apartment complex, for which the prefect had granted a permit, would
destroy the beauty of a beach near St. Tropez. When the Minister
of Construction reversed the decision to issue the permit, the developer of the complex sought relief in the administrative courts.
Though it continued to apply contr~le minimum, the Conseil upheld the Minister's action on the theory that, in view of the incongruity between the proposed structure and the landscape in which
it was to be built, the issuance of the permit was clearly erroneous
and the Minister had no choice but to revoke it. In subsequent
legislation); Socift6 Maison Genestal, [1968] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 62, [1968] J.C.P. I 2203,
[19681 J.C.P. II 15581, [1968] A.J.D.A. 102, [1969] D. Jur. 456 (denial of tax-relief for
certain acquisitions of property).
222. Compagnie Electro-m~canique, [1963] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 167.
223. Law of Dec. 26, 1961, [1961] J.O. 11996, [1961] D.L. 28-29.
224. Dame Veuve Camilleri, [1970] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 190.
225. See Canton, [1962] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 23.
226. Socit6 du Lotissement de Ia Plage de Pampelonne, [1968] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 211,
[1968] A.J.D.A. 341, [1969] R.D.P. 320, 330.
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rulings, the Conseil d'Etat described as erreurmanifeste the government's approval of a plan to build an open-air sanatorium in an area
that failed to meet certain health standards, 22 but had no such

objection to the construction of a stable whose doors would open
directly on a village square. '
As late as 1973, the Conseil d'Etat had still not applied the
erreur manifeste doctrine to national security cases, and doubt was
expressed that it ever would. 2 9 But in the Librairie Francois

Masp~ro case of that year,2 ° the Conseil took the remaining step.
The Minister of the Interior had forbidden the sale or distribution
of the French edition of the TricontinentalReview, a publication of
the Havana-based Organization for Solidarity of the Peoples of
Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The tribunal administratif dismissed the action and the Conseil d'Etat affirmed, noting that "so
long as it is not based upon erredr manifeste, the Minister's judgment about the impact of the review on public order may not be reexamined by the administrative courts.

' 231

Relief, however,

was granted on grounds of erreur manifeste in a 1975 decision setting aside an order for the deportation of a Bulgarian refugee who
had entered and remained in France illegally and had neither a job
nor financial means.2 32 The commissaire du gouvernement sug-

gested that these facts alone did not make the petitioner "a threat
227. See Mendelssohn, [1968] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 442.
228. See Commune de Bozas, [1970] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 139, [1970] J.C.P. II 16340,
[1970] A.J.D.A. 225.
229. Before 1973, one authority suggested: "Nothing at present would indicate that
erreur manifeste must one day be extended to all cases of contr6le minimum, and especially
to national security matters: the doctrine seems to be confined to decisions taken on the basis
of technical considerations." KORNPROBST, supra note 217, at 123. For a contrary prediction
see GALABERT & GENTOT, supra note 216, at 553: "As soon as we place it on the same level as
the other elements of le contr6le minimum, erreur manifeste should be extended automatically to all cases where this contr6le minimum applies."
230. Societ Librairie Franqois Masp6ro, [1973] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 611, [1974] J.C.P.
11 17642, [1973] A.J.D.A. 557, 603.
2-31.Id. at 612, [1974] J.C.P. II at 17642, [19731 A.J.D.A. at 604. In recommending
that the Conseil d'Etat review the ban for erreur manifeste, the commissaire du
gouvernement said:
Judicial review is the necessary counterpart of such exceptional authority. Of
course, we cannot review. . . the opportunit6of the measure, since the legislature
made this power discretionary. But we should not be confined to enforcing procedural rules, which are almost nonexistent, or to discovering d~tournement de
pouvoir, which is always difficult to prove. The way out . . . is supplied by the
notion of erreur manifeste.
Conclusions of commissaire du gouvernement Braibant, [1974] J.C.P. II 17642, quoted in
Franc & Boyon, Chronique Gnrale de Jurisprudence Administrative Franqaise, [1973]
A.J.D.A. 557, 580.
232. Ministre de l'Interieur v. Pardov, [1975] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 83, [1975] A.J.D.A.
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to public order," within the meaning of the deportation law, unless
it could be shown that they "had driven him to commit or attempt
to commit acts likely to disturb our social organization." 3 The
Conseil d'Etat agreed that "when he concluded that the facts...
justified considering petitioner's presence a threat to public order,
the Minister committed erreurmanifeste."'
The doctrine of erreurmanifeste seems to have given the courts
a means of ensuring that the government's application of the law
to the facts in discretionary and technical matters is always reasonable, even if not always right. With its recent extension to national
security matters, the doctrine appears to have eliminated the last
vestige of unfettered administrative discretion. Nothing now would
seem to prevent the courts from applying the notion of erreur
manifeste to such questions as whether the disciplinary sanctions
imposed on a civil servant are appropriate under the circumstances,ms and many members of the Conseil d'Etat expect the court to
do so on the first suitable occasion. Of course, the merits of certain
decisions may always be difficult to review, even for erreur
manifeste, if only because of their inherent subjectivity. The selection of a street name25 or the decision by the Com6die Frangaise not
23
237
to perform a particular theatrical piece come quickly to mind; 1
but with some imagination abuses of discretion are conceivable
there as well.
As it has evolved, the idea of erreurmanifeste is plainly a compromise.2 39 Its purpose was to enable the courts to exercise a modest
233. Unpublished conclusions of commissaire du gouvernement Gr~visse, quoted in
[1975] A.J.D.A. 131.
234. Ministre de l'Int~rieur v. Pardov, [1975] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 83, [1975] A.J.D.A.
143. The same month, the Conseil d'Etat reviewed for the first time the denial of a passport,
though it held in thatcase that the government commited no erreurmanifeste in concluding
that petitioner's travel abroad might endanger public safety. Fou~r6, [1975] A.J.D.A. 143.
For prior case law, see cases cited note 155 supra.
235. See notes 80, 149 and accompanying text supra. The Conseil's refusal to review
the proportionality of sanctions was reaffirmed as recently as 1967, despite the suggestion of
commissaire du gouvernement Kahn that review at least for erreurmanifeste be available.
Administration G~nerale de l'Assistance Publique v. Demoiselle Chevreau, [19691 D. Jur.
51. The argument for extension of erreur manifeste to such an issue was made again in
Labetoulle & Cabanes, Chronique Gen6rale de JurisprudenceAdministrative Francaise,
[19711 A.J.D.A. 33, 36 [hereinafter cited as LABETOULLE & CABANES].

236. See Ville de Lisieux, [1953] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 8, [1953] D. Jur. 391.
237. See Palaprat, [1954] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 118, [1954] J.C.P. II 8205, [19541
A.J.D.A. 277, [1954] R.D.P. 1072.
238. It should be remembered that such decisions are still reviewable in terms of their
external legality, for pure errors of law and for d~tournement de pouvoir.
239. G. VEDEL, supra note 35, at 600. See also Franc & Boyon, supra note 231, at 580;
VINcrr, supra note 206, at 419. According to de Laubad~re, "the judge is making up for his
traditional abstention from review, by now reviewing a decision when the error seems to him
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measure of review over the legal characterization of fact in those
cases where previously they exercised none at all.
However, while the purpose of the erreur manifeste idea may
be clear, its meaning is not. The best description we have comes
from one commissaire du gouvernement:
Our condemnation of erreur manifeste is meant to require
the government to show respect for a minimum of logic
and common sense.. . . Even when they have the author-

ity to do as they see fit, government officials may not do
just anything. .

.

. Erreur manifeste is a palpable error

that is raised by the parties, recognized by the judge,2 and
about which no enlightened person can have doubt.

1

The commissaire also defined erreurmanifeste as "an error so seri-

ous and patent that even a layman can see it. ' '2 ' Formulas such as

these are certainly no more precise than the "arbitrary, capricious,
or abuse of discretion" standard in American administrative law. In
fact, the exact equivalents of some of our terms have entered the
vocabulary of erreur manifeste, which now, for example, is sometimes said to occur "when the administration, willingly or not,
abuses the discretion vested in it, or exceeds the limits of reasonableness in the judgment that it makes on the basis of the information available.

2142

But as in American administrative law, so in droit

administratif,the real significance of notions such as these lies in
the uses to which they are put.
5. Unreasonableness in Droit Administratif: the Limits of Comparative Law
Little is to be gained by comparing France's erreur manifeste
with our "abuse of discretion" if the comparison is to be made on a
purely verbal level. We can, without great risk, assume that as
formulas they mean much the same thing. In practice, however,
erreur manifeste seems to be something other than its nearest anato be manifest."A. DE LAUBADiRE, supranote 2, at 546. President Odent describes the doctrine
as "designed to impose on administrative authorities a mimimum of good sense and logic,
censuring gross errors and unreasonable conclusions." R. ODENT, supra note 39, at 1570.
240. Unpublished conclusions of commissaire de gouvemement Braibant in Lambert,
[1970] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 665, [1971] A.J.D.A. 53, quoted in LABETOULLE & CABANES, supra
note 235, at 35. See also conclusions of commissaire du gouvernement Baudouin in Soci~t6
Beauregard et Compagnie, [1968] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 1088, [1968] A.J.D.A. 417, 419.
241. Unpublished conclusions of commissaire du gouvernement Braibant, supra note
240. "
242. Id.
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logues in American administrative law. The difference itself probably reflects a more basic contrast in the climate of judicial activity
in the two legal systems, as well as the kind of change that often
occurs when a home-grown idea is transplanted to foreign soil.
In fact, foreign law did provide the French administrative
courts with a model for strengthening judicial review. One
commissaire du gouvernement suggested to the Conseil d'Etat that
if the courts were to set aside administrative action on grounds of
erreur manifeste, they would only be doing what "British courts do
[when they] annul discretionary acts of the administration that
they find unreasonable."2 43 The Conseil d'Etat was also aware of the
Swiss Federal Court's practice of reviewing whether the government's discretionary judgments are "obviously false or arbitrary, or
rest upon an obvious oversight"-a practice based on a liberal interpretation of article 4 of the Swiss Constitution which provides simply that "[a]ll Swiss are equal before the law. 2' 44 Finally, a member of the Conseil d'Etat, Maxime Letourneur, had sat on the administrative court of the International Labor Organization alongside British and Swiss judges whose notions, respectively, of
"unreasonableness" and "obvious inadvertence" were at work. 45
That court occasionally set aside decisions in which "plainly incorrect conclusions were drawn from the record" or "essential factual
elements had not been taken into account." 4 ' The Conseil' d'Etat
was drawing on all these sources when it adopted the view that, even
in highly technical matters or in areas in which the administration
had received broad delegations of power, the courts might forbid the
government to act in absurd or irrational ways.
Despite its need for a doctrine such as erreur manifeste, the
Conseil d'Etat did not seize upon it at once. In fact, it is probably
fair to say that the doctrine's full value was appreciated only after
the Conseil d'Etat had already begun to invoke it. 41 Not only was
the Conseil's use of the erreur manifeste idea "discreet" and
"unexpected, 2 4 8 but it passed at first largely unnoticed by legal
scholars other than those who also sat on the Conseil d'Etat. 249 Even
after it had begun to mention erreur manifeste on a regular basis,
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
GALABERT

Id.
See VINCENT, supra note 206, at 411, and cases cited therein.
Id.
Id.
KoRNPRoBsT, supra note 217, at 121.
Id. at 121-23.
See, e.g., M. LONG, supra; note 64, at 124; R. ODENT, supra note 39, at 980;
& GENToT, supra note 216, at 552; LzrTOURNEUR, supra note 66, at 51.
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observers wondered just how serious the Conseil d'Etat was about
finding it. Letourneur himself, writing in 1962, described the notion
as but "a novel idea.

. .

the development of which will be interest-

ing to follow." '
Even today, erreur manifeste is seldom proven. It is certainly
far more often invoked by litigants than found to exist by the courts;
and while the numberof suits in which a claim of erreur manifeste
eventually prevails has risen steadily since 1962, the ratio of successful to unsuccessful claims has not.25' To a certain extent, this is due
to the fact that unlawful administrative action often can be set
aside on less controversial grounds, for example, incompetence or
vice de forme. Finding erreur manifeste, like finding d~tournement
de pouvoir, is a sensitive operation that implicates the content itself of public administration, and the courts prefer
to avoid it if
52
they can find some other basis for granting relief.
However, the availability of alternatives cannot alone account
for the infrequency with which administrative action has been challenged successfully on grounds of erreur manifeste; there are too
many cases on record in which the courts had no other basis for
affording relief against what would seem to be a misjudgment in the
legal characterization of fact, but still are not prepared to call it
erreur manifeste.5 3 The fact is that the Conseil d'Etat has demanded an unusually strong showing before concluding that the
government has plainly erred in applying the law to the facts. It
would appear that the government's judgment must be more than
implausible; it must be almost egregious. In this light, there is more
sense in President Odent's observation that "the government would
' One
rarely commit so blatant an error and refuse to correct it."254

scholar aptly reminds us that "since, after all, the doctrine of erreur
manifeste is only meant to reach gross errors of the government, we
250.
251.

LsroURNEUR,supra note 66 at 57.
R. ODENT, supra note 39, at 1571. According to one count, in the judicial years

1967-68, 1968-69, and 1969-70, six, four, and three administrative acts were annulled, respectively, by the Conseil d'Etat on the basis of erreur manifeste. In the period between 1961 and
1971, approximately one out of eight claims of erreurmanifeste before the Conseil d'Etat
succeeded. VINCENT,supra note 206, at 419. Among the Conseil's rulings on erreurmanifeste
between February 1975 and May 1976 that have been made available to the author, only four
granted relief on that ground. Even more telling is that of the six lower court findings of erreur
manifeste that were appealed, five were overturned by the Conseil d'Etat.
252. See Cauchard, [1967] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 442; Ministre de l'Agriculture v. Demoiselle Durant, [1967] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 2, [1967] J.C.P. II 15001; Ministre de l'Agriculture v.
Luciani, [19641 Reec. Cons. d'Et. 306. See R. ODENr, supra note 39, at 1565.
253. See G.VEDEL, supra note 35, at 600.
254. R. ODENT, supra note 39, at 1572.
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should not be too greedy. ' ' 5
One pair of cases gives an idea of the threshold that must be
crossed before erreurmanifeste is reached. In the first, the petitioner
challenged the validity of a building permit that entitled his neighbor to construct a silo without maintaining a minimum distance
between the silo and private residences already standing on adjacent lots.25 The absence of such a provision meant that the silo
could have been built less than a yard from the petitioner's home,
a fact which explains why the government twice before had refused
to issue an unconditional permit. The petitioner contended that
issuance of the permit violated applicable law under which a permit
"may only be refused, or issued subject to special conditions, if the
proposed structure, on account of its size or location, would endanger public health or safety. ' ' 2 7 As noted,2 8 the courts exercise only
conr6le minimum in reviewing the issuance of such a permit, on the
theory that the law may authorize the administration to deny a
permit when public health or safety is endangered, but does not
compel it to do so. The petitioner's arguments persuaded the
commissaire du gouvernement to recommend that the Conseil
d'Etat void the permit on grounds of erreur manifeste:
The permit made it possible to construct a silo on the
border of the two lots, that is, at a distance of between .70
and 1.45 m. from petitioner's home. Now everyone knows
that, except for the forests of the south of France, nothing
catches fire as easily as a silo. Petitioner cites numerous
examples of the risk [of fire]. All that is needed is that a
child play with matches, that a careless smoker toss a lit
cigarette, or that a tractor spit a spark. Indeed, it can
happen that, under certain conditions of heat and dryness,
hay or straw will catch fire spontaneously. 259
The Conseil d'Etat did not decide the question of erreur manifeste;
rather, it found that issuance of the permit was a d~tournement de
pouvoir, a suggestion the commissaire du gouvernement had ex255. LABrOULL & CABANES, supra note 235, at 36.
256. Lambert, [1970] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 665, [1971] A.J.D.A. 53.
257. Decree of Nov. 30, 196., art. 2, [1961] J.O. 11169, [1961] D.L. 359.
258. Soci~t6 du Lotissement de la Plage de Pampelonne, [1968] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 211.
259. Unpublished conclusions of commissaire du gouvernement Braibant in Lambert,
supra note 240, quoted in LABETouL.- & CABANFs, supra note 235, at 35. The commissaire
also cited a 1943 circular of the Minister of Agriculture, no longer in effect, prescribing a
minimum distance of thirty meters between silos and any other structures, to reduce the
destructiveness of fires.
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pressly considered and dismissed. 2 " It is unclear whether the Conseil d'Etat would have found erreur manifeste if no other ground for
annulment had been available. The opinion reads as if the evidence
of d~tournement de pouvoir were tenuous: instead of referring to
specific facts in support of its conclusion, as is its usual practice, the
Conseil cited nothing more than the government's "unexplained
change of mind and the ensemble of circumstances. 0'21 That the
evidence of d~tournement de pouvoir appears to have been rather
thin would suggest that the Conseil may have found the evidence
of erreur manifeste even thinner. It is still more significant that the
Conseil d'Etat selected as the basis for its decision a ground which
it is not only reluctant to use, but which it considers to be strictly a
last resort. 212 According to two commentors and members of the
Conseil d'Etat, the case "shows without much doubt that the
[Conseil] meant to reject the claim of erreur manifeste."23
In the Librairie FranqoisMasp~ro case,8 4 the Minister of the
Interior justified his ban on the sale and distribution of the
TricontinentalReview on the ground that its circulation would prejudice French foreign relations and domestic order. The commissaire
du gouvernement considered that judgment clearly wrong, in that
the Review contained "nothing original, nothing particularly virulent,"2 5 nothing that would impair France's national or international interests. He failed to see a sufficient connection between it
and either the May 1968 student revolt in Paris or the rise in urban
guerrilla warfare to justify an absolute ban reaching "every single
issue of the review, past and future, irrespective of its individual
2 6 The commissaire found particularly telling
content.""
the fact that
the government seized only a few issues of the review, when under
the law it could have confiscated every issue, and surely would have
done so, if they all contained material as inflammatory as the
sweeping ban implied. The Conseil d'Etat nonetheless sustained the
measure.
The belief that, by definition, erreur manifeste should be obvious from the face of an administrative decision has procedural
implications as well. If courts are too quick to look beyond the
260.

LABETOULLE & CABANFs, supra note 235, at 34.
261. Lambert, [1970] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 665, [1971] A.J.D.A. 53.
262. See M. LETOURNEUR, supra note 1, at 158; G. VEDEL, supra note 35, at 603.
263. 'LABETouLi & CABANaS, supra note 235, at 34.
264. Socit6 Librairie Frangois Masp~ro, [1973] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 611, [1974] J.C.P.
II 17642, [1973] A.J.D.A. 603.
265. Conclusions of commissaire du gouvernement Braibant, [1974] J.C.P. IH 17642,
quoted in FRANC & BoYoN, supra note 231, at 581.
266. Id.
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decision itself in search of erreur manifeste, they may end up calling
an error "manifest" when it is not manifest at all. Actually, the
Conseil d'Etat has not taken so orthodox a view of the matter,
primarily because it prefers to give the tribunaux administratifs
latitude in deciding what kind of investigation each case warrants.
Still, the Conseil does not endorse indiscriminate use of formal
means of proof in erreurmanifeste cases. Such measures may be out
of order if the petitioner has not yet shown that an ultimate finding
of erreur manifeste is probable. In one case, the Conseil d'Etat
reversed as "without purpose" the decision of a tribunal
administratif ordering that an expertise be held to determine
whether action by a local land redistribution board was clearly erroneous.

27

The difficulty for the Conseil d'Etat with the idea of erreur
manifeste stems in part from its vagueness. It is true that, while
they are obviously vague, terms like "reasonableness" are valued in
American law precisely for the flexibility and apparent consistency
that they give to the law.2 8 Indeed, so mindful are we of how terms
of breadth enable our institutions to meet shifting standards of fair
and sound government that we can easily fail to appreciate that
finding a fundamental legal concept "not devoid of the equivocal
and, though very convenient, hardly rigorous on a logical level" 269
2
may be quite disagreeable to a foreign legal culture. 1
It should also be kept in mind that, until it adopted the doctrine of erreur manifeste, the Conseil d'Etat had preserved the illusion that courts have only two options with respect to the legal
characterization of fact: to reexamine the matter fully, or not at all.
While judicial practice was not quite that simple, the Conseil d'Etat
had never suggested so clearly that judicial review might be a matter of degree!"
267. Ministre de l'Agriculture v. Peyron, [19661 Rec. Cons. d'Et. 592 ("It appears from
the record . . . that petitioner has made no showing that the board's decision . . . rested on
erreur manifeste or incorrect basic facts, and, under these circumstances, the expertise ordered is without purpose and the [government] properly asks that the order be set aside.");
accord, Ministre de l'Agriculture v. Epoux Pasquier, [1969] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 466; see
VINcENT, supra note 206, at 420.
268. See generally L. BRowN & J. GARNER, supra note 4, at 156-57; B. SCHWARTZ, supra
note 14, at 663-64.
269. FRANC & BOYON, supra note 231, at 580.
270. See generally KORNPROBST, supra note 217, at 123.
271. The Conseil d'Etat's current formula for controle minimum makes this perfectly
clear: external illegality aside, the judge examines whether there has been "error of fact, error
of law, manifest error in the legal characterization of fact or misapplication of power," (emphasis added). Soci~t6 Maison Genestal, [19681 Rec. Cons. d'Et. 62, [1969] D. Jur. 456,
[1968] J.C.P. 1 2203, [1968] J.C.P. II 15581, [1968] A.J.D.A. 102.
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Perhaps most serious of all, by adopting the doctrine of erreur
manifeste, the Conseil d'Etat proclaimed its willingness to tolerate
error, provided of course that it was not too egregious. While bringing the doctrine into contrlle minimum reduced the probability
that administrative error might pass unnoticed by the courts, the
Conseil had never before so plainly acknowledged that possibility. 2 2 It is hardly surprising, given certain lingering illusions about
the nature of the judicial process, that the doctrine of erreur manifeste sounded "bold and irritating." 723 or constituted "something
of a revolution at the Palais Royal. ' 274 These illusions may account
for the reluctance with which the courts turn to erreur manifeste
and the fact that they reserve it for government action that they find
275
truly outrageous.
The doctrine of erreur manifeste raised doubts of a different
order among those who favored the elimination by the courts of all
unfettered administrative discretion. One writer observed that the
doctrine "can either play the part of Zorro,. . . deterring the improper characterization of fact, . . . or it can, like the villain Iago, play
the traitor and usher in a reduction in judicial authority."2 78 T]hat
the writer feared was that the courts might begin exercising limited
instead of full review, now that the former had become a more
attractive alternative. There was less concern that the Conseil
d'Etat might actually retreat to contr6le minimum in areas where
contr6le normal had been the rule, than that the Conseil would
simply cease upgrading its standards of review. After all, why
should the courts ever reconsider their technical competence in a
given area or infer legal conditions for the use of a discretionary
power where none had been supplied? The doctrine of erreur
manifeste enabled them to reach the worst cases without having to
go to these lengths.
In fact, it appears that no category of cases has slipped back
from full to limited review. 77 On the contrary, despite the availabil272. One observer suggests that the doctrine "signifies no more and no less than that
there is a zone where the government can commit serious blunders which a judge will not
correct, unless they strike him as flagrant." VINCENT, supra note 206, at 418.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 413. The Palais Royal in Paris is the seat of the Conseil d'Etat.
275. LABETOULLE & CABANES, supra note 235, at 35.
276. KORNPROBST, supra note 217, at 124; accord, GALABERT & GENTOT, supra note 216,
at 553.
277. LABrouLLE & CABAs, supranote 235, at 36; VINCENT, supra note 206, at 414-15.
There is some uncertainty as to the issue of physical fitness for military service. In a 1968
decision, Ministre des Armies v. Bachex, [1968] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 628, [1969] A.J.D.A. 20,
[1969] R.D.P. 709, [1969] Rzv. ADM. 314, the Conseil expressly held the issue to be subject
to contrlle minimum, including erreurmanifeste, whereas in a ruling of the previous year,
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ity of erreur manifeste, the Conseil d'Etat has frequently decided to
begin exercising full review over the legal characterization of fact in
areas traditionally considered too delicate for that kind of review.2 8
Formerly, the courts looked upon military discipline as such an
area, but in 1973 the Conseil d'Etat expressly adopted contr6le
normal as its standard and set aside the suspension of an air force
captain because his alleged misdeeds "were not in themselves sufficient to justify imposing a disciplinary sanction. ' 79 Similarly, the
courts had always recognized the unqualified discretion of mayors
in issuing permits for public performances, requiring at most that
permit refusals rest on something having to do with the mainte8 When a popular music enthusiast chalnance of public order.2
lenged the refusal by the mayor of Aix-en-Provence to permit him
to stage a music festival in that city, the commissaire du
gouvernement persuaded the Conseil not just to begin reviewing for
erreur manifeste, but to bypass that stage and to move directly to
28
full review.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For all their acceptance of legal categories, few French jurists
believe that formulas decide concrete cases. The administrative
judge knows that, try as he may, he cannot give to all issues the
same fresh evaluation that contr6le normal prescribes. Acceptance
of the erreur manifeste idea is, above all, a frank recognition of
Hermann, [1967] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 394, full review had been exercised. According to commentators and members of the Conseil d'Etat, this change of policy had nothing to do with
the availabilty of review for erreurmanifeste. In view of the speed with which military orders
are executed, if the judge were to exercise full review, he would grant relief long after it could
serve any useful purpose. The commissaire du gouvernement predicted that the judge would
always be "one war behind" and that the remedy would be "totally vain." Dewost & Denoix
de Saint-Marc, Chronique Gn~rale de JurisprudenceAdministrative Franqaise, [19691
A.J.D.A. 20.
278. E.g., Soci~t6 des Ciments Lafarge, [1974] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 628, [1975] A.J.D.A.
237 (whether the Minister of Agriculture properly considered the denial of a deforestation
permit "necessary for the biological equilibrium of the region"); Chereau, [1970] Rec. Cons.
d'Et. 732 (whether rural land redistribution has made farming conditions more favorable).
279. Massot, [1973] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 359, [1973] A.J.D.A. 353, 366. Typical of prior
case law is Jacquot, [1958] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 225.
280. See, e.g., Commune de St. Genest-de-Contest, [1969] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 29; Soci~t6
du Cirque Pinder, [1955] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 382; Hubert de Ternay, [1953] Rec. Cons. d'Et.
66.
281. Clement et Association pour la D~fense de la Culture et de Ia Musique Contemporaine, [1975] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 427, [1975] A.J.D.A. 581. The commissaire du gouvernement,
eager to show that full review could be meaningful, suggested that a case might well arise in
which the government's claim of danger to public safety would be exaggerated, and that in
such a case a decision to deny permission would be annulled. Unpublished conclusions of
commissaire du gouvernement Denoix de Saint-Marc.
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something the Conseil d'Etat must have known all along: that there
is simply no such thing as a single measure of review, unless it is
defined so loosely as to deprive it of real meaning.282 The fact is that
a judge cannot help but feel more competent in certain areas than
in others. Inevitably, he will find some fields of administrative activity especially appropriate for his intervention, others less so.
Moreover, being human, he will bring vigor to the defense of those
private interests he regards as particularly worthy. In fact, the reality that the judge administers his review by degrees rather than
fully, not at all, or even at some fixed intermediate level, is clearer
today than ever; for just as the erreur manifeste standard seemed
to be the perfect compromise between full review and no review,
the Conseil d'Etat began to talk, in selected areas, of a cost-benefit
analysis,2 3 yet another new way of looking at administrative decisions.
If we were to judge the value of examining a foreign law strictly
by the number of problems which it will solve for us, French administrative law might not deserve quite the attention it receives from
Anglo-American legal scholars. In much of what it says, the Conseil
d'Etat departs from the notion that administrative courts should
review factual issues to the fullest extent technically and legally
possible. This premise draws strength from the fact that administrative judges in France are an unusual breed. They are officially
civil servants 2s4 who have studied at a specialized school of public
administration and need not- even be lawyers.2 5 Their position allows them ample opportunity for first-hand administrative experience before, after, and even during their judicial careers, 26 and they
are engaged daily in giving the government legal and political advice. 2 7 The investigative procedures adopted by the French courts
reflect an active involvement in administration as such that we do
not routinely expect or even ask of our courts. 211 Perhaps the most
influential factor of all is the modest extent to which the French
government operates along the quasi-judicial lines that are so common among American administrative agencies. It has only strength282. According to two members of the Conseil d'Etat, the doctrine of erreur manifeste
"has a solid basis in the psychology of the administrative judge, who tends to think, even in
cases where his review theoretically is total, that he should not substitute his judgment for
the government's, unless the latter is plainly enough in error." GALABERT & GENTOT, supra
note 216, at 553.
283. See note 119 and accompanying text supra.
284. A. DE LAUBADtRE, supra note 2, at 391-92.
285. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
286. See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
287. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
288. See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
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ened the belief that if government action in France is to be scrutinized at all, the administrative courts are the ones to do the job.
Droit adminstratifhas not left this American observer with the
impression that its decisions or even its institutions are somehow
superior to our own. Some statements of the Conseil seem to go too
far, others not far enough, in telling the government what and what
not do do; in either case some of what it tells them may be bad
policy. We have noted too that court opinions as such are a great
deal less candid in France than they are in the United States in that
they seldom tell the lay reader why the court ruled as it did, yet
often leave the impression that it could not have ruled any other
way.
But even after all this has been said, it is difficult not to admire
the shape and structure that the Conseil d'Etat is attempting to give
to French administrative law. Of course, certain external factors
favor the Conseil in its efforts. France traditionally has had a highly
unified and centralized system of government, which means, for
example, that the number of statutes and regulations that the
courts are called upon to construe are much fewer in number than
would be the case in a federal system. In addition, the cases that
reach the Conseil d'Etat on appeal come from a small number of
lower courts28 9 and are not so numerous as to prevent it from reviewing every one of them. The contrast between such an institutional
setting and the one in which our Supreme Court does its work is
plain, as are its implications for the unity of the law. Apart from
this, the tradition of logical analysis in French legal scholarship
contributes an extra measure of coherence to the law that it might
otherwise'lack.
Still, to all this, the Conseil d'Etat has added unifying elements of its own, the best example of which is the institution of
commissaire du gouvernement whose analysis of the issues and
synthesis of past decisions help the courts keep an eye firmly on the
law as a whole as they decide the individual cases before them.
Certain other institutional aspects of the Conseil d'Etat might also
be mentioned, 90 but no factor is as important as the capacity of its
289.
290.

There are at present twenty-five tribunaux administratifsin metropolitan France.
One such arrangement is the Conseil d'Etat's practice of freeing two of its younger

members from active judicial duty for a year or two in order to maintain a Centre de
Documentation that enables the entire Conseil d'Etat, and the tribunauxadministratis,as
well as legal scholars and lawyers who appear before the administrative courts, to keep
abreast of the decisions handed down by the Conseil's various panels. They pay special
attention to the rulings of the Section or Assemble, which include representatives from all
the panels and decide those cases in which the Conseil d'Etat considers introducing important
changes in its case law or otherwise rendering a critical decision. The same two judges also
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membership to build a principled body of law and its will to do so.
This article has related the Conseil's recent efforts to refine some
of the prevailing generalizations about the scope of judicial review
in France.
Certain of our most eminent scholars rightly call for more
"integrity"-more analysis and principle-in American administrative law. 2 11 Yet others are suggesting that the scope of review has
already received too much attention. 29 2 The problem with the latter
view is that it rests on the assumption that scope of review may not
be worth discussing at all unless it can be reduced to one or two
meaningful generalizations. We, like the French, have had considerable experience with across-the-board generalizations on the scope
of review of administrative action whose predictive as well as intellectual value seems to be minimal. 23 Again like the French, we may
have to content ourselves in the future with what might be called a
differentiated scope of review: an assortment of tests, each one tailoring judicial review to the particular substantive area of the law
it is meant to govern. Considering the variety of ways in which
government touches our lives, we cannot realistically expect that a
few general formulas for defining the scope of review can continue
to serve us adequately. It may of course be comforting to be told by
our courts that they review both the issuance of a zoning variance
and the decision to classify a site as picturesque by a unified
"arbitrary and capricious" standard. But if we must choose between
that kind of unity and the unity that comes from having developed
a set of meaningful criteria by which courts may determine the
validity of all variances or of all site classifications, we should have
little hesitation in preferring the latter.
write a column entitled Chronique. Gn~rale de JurisprudenceAdministrative Frangaise,
which appears in the monthly journal, Actualit6 JuridiqueDroit Administratif, a scholarly
publication devoted entirely to French administrative law, and which analyzes administrative case law on subjects of particular interest.
291. L. JAFFE, supra note 14, at 589-90; J. LANDIS, ADMINISTRATIVE PROcESS 146 (1938).
According to Kenneth Davis, the Supreme Court has ceded to lower federal courts, notably
to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, its traditional leadership in developing
standards for judicial review of administrative action. K. DAVIS, supra note 23, at 656-58, 68893, and cases cited therein. For a recent plea for greater attention to the scope of review,
see Schotland, FederalJudicial Review, 26 AD. L. REV. 119, 124-25 (1974).
292. Gellhorn & Robinson, Perspectiveson Administrative Law, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 771,
779-80.
293. Gellhorn and Robinson suggest, for example, that terms such as "arbitrary and
capricious" or "substantial evidence" are "virtually devoid of practical content" and at best
"little more than convenient labels attached to results reached without their aid." They
conclude in fact that "the rules governing judicial review have no more substance at the core
than a seedless grape." Id. at 780.

